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Most people hold that it is wrong to sacrifice some humans to save a greater number of 
humans. Do people also think that it is wrong to sacrifice some animals to save a greater 
number of animals, or do they answer such questions about harm to animals by engaging in a 
utilitarian cost-benefit calculation? Across 10 studies (N = 4,662), using hypothetical and 
real-life sacrificial moral dilemmas, we found that participants considered it more permissible 
to harm a few animals to save a greater number of animals than to harm a few humans to save 
a greater number of humans. This was explained by a reduced general aversion to harm 
animals compared to humans, which was partly driven by participants perceiving animals to 
suffer less and to have lower cognitive capacity than humans. However, the effect persisted 
even in cases where animals were described as having greater suffering capacity and greater 
cognitive capacity than some humans, and even when participants felt more socially 
connected to animals than to humans. The reduced aversion to harming animals was thus also 
partly due to speciesism—the tendency to ascribe lower moral value to animals due to their 
species-membership alone. In sum, our studies show that deontological constraints against 
instrumental harm are not absolute but get weaker the less people morally value the 
respective entity. These constraints are strongest for humans, followed by dogs, chimpanzees, 
pigs, and finally inanimate objects. 
 
Keywords: moral judgments, utilitarianism, harm aversion, speciesism, human–animal 
relations  
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Utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people? Harming animals and 
humans for the greater good   
Utilitarianism tells us to always maximize the good. This is an attractive moral aim in 
many cases—few would deny that, for example, we should try to save as many lives as we 
can, and generally minimize harm to others. In some cases, however, most people think that it 
would be wrong to maximize the good because this would violate what moral philosophers 
call ‘deontological side constraints’ (Nozick, 1974)—moral rules that forbid harming, 
torturing, or killing innocents, even for a good end. A great deal of recent psychological 
research has examined whether and under what circumstances people hold deontological 
constraints (e.g., Greene, 2014). For example, in the famous Footbridge trolley case 
(Thomson, 1984) a large majority of people are reluctant to push one person off a bridge to 
save the lives of five people trapped on the tracks of an oncoming train (Greene, 2009), and it 
has even been claimed that such constraints are universal and innate (Mikhail, 2007). What 
has not been studied yet is whether people also apply deontological rules to non-human 
animals (from now on simply ‘animals’). Are people as reluctant to harm animals to save a 
greater number of animals as they are for humans? And if indeed people do accept such 
constraints on harm to animals, are these deontological constraints similar in structure and 
strength to those that protect humans? 
Kant (1785) offered one answer to these questions. He argued that the source of the 
deontological constraints that protect us from being sacrificed for the sake of others is our 
unique rational nature—our rationality makes us priceless and, therefore, we cannot be an 
input into a utilitarian cost-benefit calculation. On Kant’s own view, this meant that, because 
animals are not rational, they do not morally matter in their own right, though he frowned 
upon gratuitous cruelty to animals because it could make us more willing to harm humans. 
The philosopher Robert Nozick (1974) famously discussed an alternative principle he 
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referred to as: “utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people”. On this view, which 
Nozick himself did not entirely endorse, animals do matter, but they matter very differently 
than humans. As non-rational individuals, they do not enjoy deontological protections and 
can be entered into utilitarian calculations. The philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson similarly 
writes that, unlike humans, “animals do not have claims to not be killed… Would it be 
permissible to kill one chicken to save five chicken? I think it would.” (Thomson, 1990). 
It is clear that people value animals less than humans. This universal phenomenon 
shows across various contexts and has been investigated by both philosophers (e.g., Singer, 
1975) and psychologists (e.g., Amiot & Bastian, 2015; Caviola, Everett, & Faber, 2019; 
Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016). Psychological research has shown that to large extent people 
morally prioritize humans over animals simply on the basis of species-membership—a 
tendency referred to as speciesism (Caviola et al., 2019; Horta, 2010; Singer, 1975). Still it 
remains an open question how exactly people value animals (cf. Goodwin, 2015). In 
particular, we are interested in what types of deontological constraints against harming 
animals or humans people may hold. We focus on the context of sacrificial moral dilemmas 
to study whether people are willing to harm a few animals or humans to save many animals 
or humans, and whether this willingness is uniform across these decision contexts. It is 
obvious that people are more willing to sacrifice animals than humans for a fixed benefit, 
e.g., to save many humans. However, it is unclear (i) to what extent people are willing to 
harm a few animals to save many animals, and (ii) how this tendency compares to their 
willingness to harm a few humans to save many humans. Current research is compatible with 
multiple answers to these questions. Are people’s intuitions about such dilemmas correctly 
captured by Kant, utilitarianism, Nozick, or by some other view? In this paper we 
systematically test a range of possible descriptive ethical views of how people apply 
deontological constraints against harm to humans and animals.  
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Why is this of interest? First, answering this question can shed important light on the 
psychology of moral judgment more generally, and of moral status specifically. Typically, 
moral psychology has focused on scenarios involving human characters lacking concrete 
identities (cf. Hester & Gray, 2019). It is likely, though, that people are sensitive to who those 
characters are. In this work, we investigate whether people take into account the species-
membership of the characters at stake. Do deontological constraints pervade all moral 
thinking, or do they only apply in the human context? If deontological constraints apply only 
to humans, how does morality operate with regards to other species? Focusing on dilemmas 
where we can sacrifice some humans to save a greater number, Greene (2014) has suggested 
that people engage in either utilitarian or deontological modes of moral thinking, and that 
when the two compete, the intuitive, deontological mode typically prevails. If deontological 
constraints apply only to humans, this would mean that this dual process picture applies only 
in the human domain, and that moral judgment in the animal domain is the result of a single 
process of utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. Conversely, if deontological constraints do apply 
to animals, this would raise the psychological question of whether these deontological 
constraints apply in the same way to animals as they do to humans. Moreover, since this 
would show that, contra Kant, people do not base deontological constraints in rationality or 
other higher cognitive capacity, it would raise the further question of what is the basis of such 
constraints—is it mere suffering capacity (i.e., sentience), the existence or lack of a social 
relationship with the potential victim, or something else? 
 Second, how people think about the moral status of animals is of intrinsic interest. 
Animals are routinely harmed to benefit humans (e.g., for consumption or for medical 
experiments), and in some cases animals are harmed to benefit other animals. It is not yet 
clear whether most people nevertheless hold that there are moral constraints on when and 
whether such harm is permissible, and what psychological processes underlie such intuitions. 
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Understanding these psychological processes may have potential practical implications. For 
example, certain wildlife conservation policies allow the killing of predator animals like 
wolves in order to protect other animal species. Other cases exist in the context of livestock: 
Should a farmer be allowed to kill a few pigs infected by the swine flu in order to prevent 
many more pigs to be infected and killed? Should it be legal to experiment on a few chickens 
in order to benefit (or bring into existence) many more chickens? Another real-world case is 
the question of whether it is ethically more problematic to consume certain animals than 
others. For example, a cow produces about 200 times as much meat as a chicken, which 
means that producing the same amount of meat requires killing far fewer individuals in the 
case of cows compared to in the case of chickens. Depending on the relative strengths in 
deontological constraints against harm that people hold for these animals, sacrificing certain 
animals to benefit humans (or other animals) may be more problematic than sacrificing 
others. 
 
When is harm towards humans and animals permissible? 
In order to investigate how people think about harm to animals vs. to humans, we first 
need to set out the theoretical options (Table 1). Our aim is to try to identify the moral views 
that are most consistent with lay people’s intuitions. The first two views we will mention are 
well-known philosophical positions that we include for completeness sake even if they are 
unlikely to be psychologically accurate. The remaining views are all plausible descriptions of 
people’s intuitions and have sometimes even been described as such. Note that we are not 
suggesting that people explicitly endorse one of these moral views. Rather, we ask which 
moral view most closely aligns with the way people think about harm to humans vs. to 
animals. Why this might be the case, and what underlying psychological mechanisms cause 
these judgments, are further questions that we will address below. 













Utilitarianism ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Kant’s view ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Cross Species Deontology  ✕  ✕  ✕ 
Nozick’s slogan ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Multi-level Uniform Deontology ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Multi-level Weighted Deontology weighted weighted ✓ 
Note. Utilitarianism and Cross Species Deontology consider humans and animals to have 
equal moral status (assuming they are equally sentient). All other views consider humans to 
have higher moral status than animals (even if they are equally sentient). While Kant thought 
that the moral status of animals is not fundamentally different from that of objects, he did 
think that harming animals gratuitously is wrong on instrumental grounds, because it can 
make us more willing to harm humans. 
 
The first possibility is that people’s intuitions are best captured by utilitarianism. On 
this account, the same harm matters equally, regardless of who suffers it (weighted by their 
degree of sentience)—whether humans or animals (Bentham, 1780). This view is anti-
speciesist, meaning that species-membership itself should not influence the moral status of an 
individual (Regan & Singer, 1989). If people were strict utilitarians, they would consider it 
permissible (or even required) to sacrifice both humans and animals to promote the greater 
good (of both humans and animals). It is unlikely, however, that this view captures the 
intuitions of most people since, as described above, there is considerable evidence that people 
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accept deontological constraints against harming humans for the greater good (e.g., Greene, 
2014), and people tend to value animals less than humans (Caviola et al., 2019). 
Another possibility is that people’s intuitions can be described by Kant’s view. On 
this approach, only humans matter morally and therefore deserve deontological protection, 
whereas animals are just seen as objects that can be used to our own ends (Kant, 1785). The 
source of the value for humans is the fact that we, but not animals, are rational individuals 
and possess advanced cognitive capacity. This, however, is also implausible as an account of 
most people’s views since people believe that animals do matter morally at least to some 
extent (Caviola, Schubert, Kahane & Faber, 2020). 
Yet another possibility is that people’s intuitions can be described by a view we can 
call Cross Species Deontology. On this account, the same deontological principles apply in 
the same way to all species. Neither humans nor animals should be sacrificed for the greater 
good of either. Like utilitarianism, this view is anti-speciesist because species-membership 
itself should make no difference (for a similar view, see Regan, 1987). Abolitionist animal 
rights activists tend to endorse similar moral positions (e.g., Francione, 1995). This again is 
unlikely to capture the common view given that people on average think that it’s permissible 
to harm animals to benefit humans, e.g., via medical testing (Caviola et al., 2019). 
There are, however, at least three ways to capture this intuitive moral difference 
between humans and animals while still ascribing some moral significance to animals, contra 
Kant. The first is the Nozick (1974) suggestion, discussed above, that deontology applies 
only to humans, while utilitarianism applies to animals. When it comes to animals, we should 
simply maximize utility—even by sacrificing some for the greater good. But when we turn to 
humans, this is forbidden. Many moral philosophers take Nozick’s suggestion very seriously 
(cf. Thomson, 1990; McMahan, 2002; Kagan, 2019; Killoren & Streiffer, 2019) and the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics has even called utilitarian cost-benefit analysis the 
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“cornerstone” of research on animals (Kilkenny, Browne, Cuthill, Emerson, & Altman, 2010; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2005). Moral philosophers often assume that Nozick’s 
suggestion reflects people’s intuitions, and that it best captures the commonsense view about 
animals (Kagan, 2019; Killoren & Streiffer, 2019). For example, people generally consider 
keeping animals in well-run zoos as morally permissible. Keeping innocent humans 
imprisoned, in contrast, is generally considered repugnant even if they were kept very happy. 
Another example is animal research. Most Western jurisdictions have a near absolute 
prohibition of more-than-minimal research on children who, like animals, cannot give 
consent (Gennet & Altavilla, 2016)—even if it could be beneficial in expectation. 
Regulations and intuitions concerning research on animals are much more permissive 
(Varner, 1994).  
A second possible view is that there is a hierarchy of moral status (cf. Kagan, 2019). 
Individuals that are lower in the hierarchy (e.g. pigs) can be sacrificed for the sake of those 
higher up (e.g. humans)1. But within each level of moral status, the deontological constraints 
offer the same protections (i.e. it’s wrong to sacrifice a pig to save five pigs), and these 
protections apply to the same degree. We call this Multi-level Uniform Deontology.  
A final, more complex view, which we call Multi-level Weighted Deontology, is that 
the deontological protections are not absolute, and get weaker the lower the level of moral 
status. As we go down the hierarchy, the less stringent the deontological constraints. 
According to this view, people would consider harming animals to save many animals neither 
 
1  Note that some philosophers define moral status in terms of the deontological 
protections that individuals enjoy. We, in contrast, assume that moral status is a more abstract 
construct which determines the extent to which people perceive it permissible or required to 
harm or help a certain individual. Moreover, moral status relates to beliefs about the moral 
status people attribute to individuals in an absolute sense and not beliefs about having special 
obligations to certain individuals. For example, people might think it is justified to prioritize 
family members over strangers while still believing that both possess the same moral status 
and rights. 
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completely permissible nor completely wrong (as Multi-level Uniform Deontology would), 
but instead somewhere in between. Further, the lower the moral status of the animal in 
question, the more permissible they would consider harming it to save many animals with the 
same moral status (i.e., it is more permissible to sacrifice one cow to save five others than to 
sacrifice one human to save five others2). In cases where the moral status of a being is very 
low (as for example with certain animals or objects), the implications of the Multi-level 
Weighted Deontology will resemble those of Nozick’s slogan because the deontological 
constraints will be low or non-existent.  
These three hypotheses have not yet been tested. Our own hypothesis is that Multi-
level Weighted Deontology is the view that describes people’s intuitions best. A growing 
body of evidence suggests that emotional aversion to harming others plays a key role in 
driving deontological constraints against harming few humans to save a greater number 
(Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; Greene, 2014; Wiech et al., 2013). Aversion to harm is a 
matter of degree, and many people clearly feel some aversion to harming animals through 
direct, ‘personal’ acts, even if to a considerably lesser degree than in the human case. If so, it 
seems unlikely that they would approach sacrificial choices involving animals in a purely 
utilitarian manner, nor that the deontological inhibitions against such harm would be as 
strong as in the human case. We therefore expect people to consider it permissible to harm 
animals to benefit humans and that they consider it somewhat, but not completely, 
permissible to harm animals to save many animals with the same moral status. Since people 
 
2 The weighted deontological constraints can show both in terms of a changing degree 
of permissibility of harming a few to save many but also in terms of a changing threshold of 
the minimum number of beings that need to be saved in order to make it permissible to harm 
a few. For example, people consider it more permissible to harm one cow to save five cows 
than to harm one human to save five humans (changing degree of permissibility), and people 
believe that a lower number of saved cows is required to make it permissible to kill ten cows 
than the number of saved humans that is required to make it permissible to kill then humans 
(changing threshold). 
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value animals much less than humans, we assumed, the deontological constraints they ascribe 
to them are likely weaker even in intra-species cases.  
Deontological constraints are thus not absolute but can get weighted and can 
sometimes be overturned (Holyoak & Powell, 2016; Kahane, 2015). For example, people are 
likely to consider it less wrong to harm a few humans to save a very large number of humans 
(Tremoliere & Bonnefon, 2014). Similarly, we expect that they will neither have absolutely 
strong nor non-existent deontological constraints against harming animals even in the intra-
species context but rather moderately strong constraints. Were we to find, however, that 
people roughly have the same deontological constraints for humans and animals in the intra-
species context, or always find it entirely permissible to sacrifice few animals to save a larger 
number, that would falsify Multi-level Weighted Deontology. 
 
Potential psychological mechanisms 
The different moral views discussed above leave the question unanswered what the 
underlying psychological mechanisms are. So far, no studies have systematically explored 
judgments in sacrificial dilemmas that involve animals. An exception is a recent study, in 
which participants were presented with two mice cages attached to an electric shock machine 
(Bostyn, Sevenhant, & Roets, 2018). Participants were informed that, as a default, the five 
mice in one of the cages would receive a painful electric shock unless participants decided to 
intervene and push a button that would instead redirect the electrical current to the other case 
that contains just one mouse. 84% of participants pushed the button. In contrast, Bostyn et al. 
found that when the same situation was described hypothetically, only 66% said that they 
would push the button. However, since the study did not directly compare cases involving 
humans against cases involving animals, we cannot draw a clear conclusion from it. Further, 
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this study involved an ‘impersonal’ moral dilemma and multiple studies have found that most 
people regard such harm as permissible even in in the human case. 
As mentioned above, previous research on sacrificial moral dilemmas has identified a 
central role for harm aversion in explaining moral judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas 
(Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; Greene, 2014). The more aversive people are to harm the 
few, the less willing they are to harm them for the greater good. When harm aversion is 
reduced, such as in cases where the harm is less personal (e.g., when one has to hit a switch 
to harm), people are more willing to harm the few for the greater good, than if the harm is 
more personal (e.g., when one has to physically push someone). There is, therefore, 
considerable evidence that, in the human case, the judgments that mirror deontological 
constraints reflect aversion to harm. Thus, it is plausible that this is also the case when we 
turn to animals.  
Therefore, one possible explanation for why people might be more willing to harm a 
few animals to save more animals than to harm a few humans to save more humans could be 
that they have a weaker aversion to harm animals in general. Studies have shown that people 
perceive humans to be more deserving of prevention of harm than animals (Caviola et al., 
2019; Everett, Caviola, Savulescu, & Faber, 2018). Further, people also endorse harming 
animals to save humans (Topolski, Weaver, Martin, & McCoy, 2013; Awad et al., 2018; 
Petrinovich, O’neill, & Jorgensen, 1993; Topolski et al., 2013).  
If reduced harm aversion for animals makes such harm seem more morally 
permissible, this raises the further question of why harm aversion for animals is weaker. One 
possibility is that people are more willing to harm animals than humans because they 
perceive animals to suffer less than humans and to have a lower cognitive capacity than 
humans. Both philosophers as well as psychologists (H. M. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; K. 
Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012) have emphasized the importance of suffering capacity (or 
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sentience) and cognitive capacity (or intelligence / rationality) for moral status attribution. 
Indeed, it has been shown that people tend to de-mentalize animals, i.e., they attribute 
reduced mental capacities (both suffering capacity and cognitive capacity) to animals 
(Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012). And the lower the perception of suffering 
capacity of animals is, the less people value the animals (Caviola et al., 2019). A recent study 
found that in trolley-like scenarios people were more likely to harm robots than humans to 
save many humans (Nijssen, Müller, Baaren, & Paulus, 2019). Yet the more human-like the 
robots were, the less likely people were to harm them, which was explained primarily due to 
the attribution of affective states. Similarly, in previous work we have shown that the 
perceived cognitive capacity can play a small though significant role in explaining the 
tendency to prioritize humans over animals (Caviola et al., 2020). For example, it seems 
plausible that people would consider harming animals with a low cognitive capacity (e.g., 
birds) more permissible than harming animals with a higher cognitive capacity (e.g., apes). 
Together, these findings suggest that perceived suffering capacity as well as cognitive 
capacity may play a part in explaining why people are more willing to harm animals than 
humans.  
A further, not mutually exclusive possibility is that people are more willing to harm 
animals than humans simply on the basis of their species-membership alone, regardless of the 
perceived capacities of the being, i.e., speciesism (Caviola, et al., 2019; Dhont et al., 2016). 
Indeed, previous research has demonstrated that people have speciesist attitudes. For 
example, they prioritize humans over animals (in cases of helping) even when perceived 
suffering capacity is taken into account (Caviola et al., 2020). We also found that speciesism 
can modulate perceived suffering capacity. That is, the more speciesist people are, the less 
they perceive animals to be capable of suffering (Caviola et al., 2019), which could in turn 
reinforce reduced harm aversion for animals. Thus, it is likely that perceived suffering 
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capacity, perceived cognitive capacity, and mere species-membership (speciesism) together 
contribute to reduced harm aversion for animals. 
Thus, our hypothesized model of the psychological mechanisms, which we refer to as 
Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism, is that people see harming animals for the greater good 
as more permissible than harming humans for the greater good because of a generally weaker 
aversion to harm animals. Harm aversion, in turn, is multiply determined: it is driven by 
perceptions of suffering capacity, perceptions of cognitive capacity, and speciesism. 
Crucially, speciesism reduces harm aversion more for animals than for humans. In short, the 
model that we will test is a moderated mediation from species condition (humans vs. animals) 
to harm aversion to degree of moral permissibility (of harming a few to save many of the 
same species), whereby the effect of condition to harm aversion is moderated by speciesism 
and where harm aversion is also predicted by perceived suffering capacity and perceived 
cognitive capacity. We do not rule out the possibility that there are effects from species 
(humans vs. animals) onto moral permissibility that do not go via harm aversion. 
Finally, we make an additional prediction, which we consider less central to the core 
model but still worth exploring. We hypothesize that speciesism will be associated with 
reduced perceived mental capacities (both suffering capacity and cognitive capacity) in 
animals but less so in humans.  
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Figure 1. The Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model describes the psychological 
mechanisms underlying judgments about the permissibility of harm to animals and humans. 
A moderated mediation from species (humans vs. animals) to harm aversion to moral 
permissibility, whereby the effect of condition to harm aversion is moderated by speciesism 
and where harm aversion is also predicted by perceived suffering capacity and perceived 
cognitive capacity. 
 
The present research 
In ten studies we tested the extent to which people accept deontological constraints 
against harming animals in both intra- and inter-species contexts. And we compared it to the 
extent to which people accept such constraints for humans. Our first aim was to test whether 
indeed people’s judgments can best be described by Multi-level Weighted Deontology. Our 
second aim was to test the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model. We tested this in 
studies 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10. The cognitive capacity factor of the model was only measured and 
tested in Study 8. In all studies participants were presented with different (usually 
hypothetical) sacrificial moral dilemmas, which involved harming either animals or humans 
in order to prevent harm to a larger number of animals or humans and asked for participants’ 
judgments of the moral permissibility of doing so.  
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Open science. As for all studies in this paper, reports of all measures, manipulations, 
and exclusions, and all data, analysis code, and experimental materials are available for 
download at: https://osf.io/nt69s/ Studies 1, 2, 5 and 9 were pre-registered on the Open 
Science Framework.  
Ethics statement. For all studies, relevant ethical guidelines were followed, and the 
research was approved through University of Oxford’s Central University Research Ethics 
Committee, with the reference numbers MS-IDREC-R56657/RE002. 
 
Study 1: Humans vs. animals 
In Study 1, we tested whether people are more willing to harm a few animals to save 
many animals (of the same species) than to harm a few humans to save many humans. Our 
reasoning was based on the Multi-level Weighted Deontology hypothesis, namely that 
people’s deontological constraints are weighted by how much they value the respective 
individual. Since people value humans much more than animals, their deontological 
constraints should be much higher for humans than for animals respectively. 
We tested a range of different animals, namely: panda bears, dogs, squirrels, 
chimpanzees, and pigs. Dogs and chimpanzees are interesting cases because they both 
typically are valued less than humans but more than pigs despite the fact that dogs and pigs 
are similar to each other in terms of level of intelligence or emotional capabilities (Caviola et 
al., 2019). Chimpanzees are the animal species that are most closely related to humans but 
still are valued considerably less than humans. Panda bears are interesting because they are 
often perceived as an especially likeable animals. Finally, squirrels are of interest because 
they are significantly smaller and of lower cognitive capacity than the other animals.  
Our hypothesis—pre-registered at https://osf.io/w863g/—was that people would 
consider it more permissible to harm one animal to save many animals than to harm one 
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human to save many humans. We also assumed that there could be differences between the 
different types of animals but did not make specific hypotheses. 
To test the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model (outlined in the introduction), 
we measured harm aversion, that is how averse to inflicting harm participants indicated to be 
for the respective beings in question, perceived suffering capacity, that is how much 
participants believed the respective beings to be capable of suffering when harmed, as well as 
speciesism (Caviola et al., 2019). For exploratory purposes, we also measured empathic 
concern (as part of the IRI; Davis, 1980), instrumental harm, that is permissive attitude 
toward instrumental harm (OUS-IH), and impartial beneficence, that is impartial concern for 
the greater good (OUS-IB). The latter two measure individual differences in utilitarian 
tendencies (Oxford Utilitarianism Scale, Kahane et al., 2018). Due to the exploratory nature 
of these three measures we will not discuss them further throughout the paper. For all studies, 
correlations between the dependent variable and the follow-up scales for each condition 
separately are reported in Table S1 in the Supplementary Materials.  
  
Method 
Development and pre-test of materials 
We developed a new moral dilemma that should be perceived as more realistic than 
the traditional trolley problem (Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014). Therefore, in a 
pre-test to Study 1 (N = 700; reported in the Supplementary Materials) we tested five 
different sacrificial dilemmas. Based on the results we have decided to rely on the vaccine 
death dilemma in the next studies. In this dilemma the sudden outbreak of a rare virus is 
described, which will kill 100 pigs (or other beings). The only way to save them is to actively 
infect 10 healthy pigs (that otherwise would not die) to identify the vaccine that can be used 
to prevent the virus from killing the other 100 pigs. 
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Participants 
We recruited 918 US American participants online via MTurk who received $0.50 
payment for their participation (in line with US minimum wage for all studies). Thirteen 
participants were excluded for failing at least one of two attention checks, leaving a final 
sample of 905 people (445 females; Mage = 41.31, SD = 12.53). We anticipated a small to 
medium effect of f = .13 between animal species based on the results the previous study that 
relied on abstract dilemmas mentioned above. With an alpha of 0.05, and power of 0.80, our 
a priori power analysis showed that we required 768 participants. Hence, we aimed to recruit 
900 participants to account for exclusions. 
Design, materials, and procedure  
This study had six between-subjects conditions to which participants were randomly 
allocated to six conditions: humans, pandas, dogs, squirrels, chimpanzees, pigs. After 
participants read the vaccine dilemma, they were asked to indicate how morally right (i.e., 
permissible) or wrong they thought it to be to harm ten animals (humans) to save one 
hundred animals (humans) on a 7-point scale from 1 (Absolutely morally wrong) to 7 
(Absolutely morally right). From now on this measure will be referred to as ‘moral 
permissibility’ throughout the paper.  
Next, participants responded to three items each that measured harm aversion (α = 
.94; in all studies, Cronbach alphas are calculated across conditions) and perceived suffering 
capacity of the respective beings (α = .95). A typical harm aversion item was: “How 
unpleasant would you personally find it to harm the one animal [person]?” with a 9-point 
response scale ranging from “mildly unpleasant” to “there is nothing else that would be more 
unpleasant”. A typical suffering capacity item was the “How strongly do you think the one 
animal [person] would suffer if you harm it [him]?” with a 9-point response scale ranging 
from “mild suffering” to “strongest imaginable suffering”. 
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We then asked participants what the smallest numbers of beings are that would need 
to be saved to make it permissible to kill the 10 beings (i.e., tipping point). Participants could 
either respond with a number in a text field or indicate that it is never right. Next, participants 
completed the Speciesism Scale (Caviola et al., 2019; α = .88), which measures individual 
differences in the tendency to assign different moral worth based on species-membership. 
The scale consists of six items, including “Morally, animals always count for less than 
humans” and “Humans have the right to use animals however they want to”.  Participants 
then completed the Empathic Concern Scale (α = .94) and the two subscales of the Oxford 




A one-way ANOVA revealed that, as predicted, moral permissibility differed 
significantly across species (Figure 2; Table 2), F(5, 899) = 23.62, p < .001, η2 = .12. 
Participants judged harming humans to save many other humans as more morally wrong than 
doing so for pandas, dogs, squirrels, chimpanzees and pigs. Similarly, many more 
participants thought that it was never right to harm ten humans irrespective of the number of 
saved humans, whereas a much smaller proportion of participants thought so when it 
concerned animals (Table 2). Figure 2 shows that deontological constraints differed slightly 
between the animals conditions. However, these differences were only significant between 
the panda bears and pigs condition and the dogs and pigs condition (Table 3). 
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Figure 2. Moral permissibility of harming 10 individuals of a species to saving 100 of the 
same species, ranging from 1 (Absolutely morally wrong), to 4 (Neither right nor wrong), to 
7 (Absolutely morally right). For all figures, black points represent raw data, horizontal bars 
represent means, rectangles represent confidence intervals, and “beans” represent smoothed 
densities. (Study 1) 
 
Table 2 












Humans 2.85 (1.84) 65% 100 7.79 (1.53) 7.91 (1.21) 
Pandas 4.33 (1.81) 34% 50 7.14 (1.83) 7.33 (1.49) 
Dogs 4.35 (1.88) 36% 50 7.38 (1.43) 7.04 (1.77) 
Squirrels 4.56 (1.78) 39% 50 6.42 (2.07) 7.01 (1.86) 
Chimpanzees 4.35 (1.88) 30% 45 6.70 (2.11) 7.20 (1.71) 
Pigs 4.85 (1.69) 25% 50 6.11 (2.08) 6.79 (1.80) 
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Note. Never right stands for the proportion of participants who thought that it was never right 
to harm ten individuals of a certain species irrespective of the number of saved individuals of 
the same species. Tipping point stands for the number of individuals that have to be saved in 
order to justify harming ten individuals of the same species (median response). 
 
Table 3 
Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for moral permissibility comparisons across conditions (Study 1) 
 Humans Pandas Dogs Squirrels Chimpanzees 
Pandas .81***     
Dogs .81*** .01    
Squirrels .94*** .13 .11   
Chimpanzees .96*** .15 .14 .03  
Pigs 1.13*** .30** .28* .17 .14 




Next, we tested the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model. The relationship 
between condition and moral permissibility was mediated by harm aversion. The 
bootstrapped indirect effect was (1.04)(-.31) = -.32, 95% CI [-.43, -.22]. Thus, the indirect 
effect was statistically significant. We conducted a hierarchical regression to test which 
factors were driving harm aversion (Table 4). We found that speciesism significantly 
moderated the effect of condition onto harm aversion. The bivariate correlation between 
speciesism and harm aversion was -.16 (p = .05) in the humans condition and -.48 (p < .001) 
in the animals condition (Table 5). In addition, speciesism itself and perceived suffering 
capacity significantly predicted harm aversion. Thus, our model was confirmed.  
HARMING ANIMALS AND HUMANS                                             22 
Table 4 shows the regression results when the humans condition was contrasted with 
all animals conditions collapsed. We also ran separate regressions where we compared the 
humans condition with each animals condition separately, controlling for perceived suffering 
capacity. We found that the speciesism moderation effect was .31 (p = .03) for humans vs. 
pandas, .27 (p = .04) for humans vs. dogs, .34 (p = .005) for humans vs. squirrels, .42 (p < 
.001) for humans vs. chimpanzees, and .53 (p < .001) for humans vs. pigs. This suggests that 
the speciesism moderation effect was stronger for those animals that participants grant 
weaker deontological constraints to.  
Finally, we found that the bivariate correlation between speciesism and suffering 
capacity was stronger in the animals conditions (r = -.40, p < .001) than in the humans 
condition (r = -.24, p = .003). Speciesism significantly moderated the effect of condition 
(humans vs. animals) onto suffering capacity (β = .22, p = .003).  
 
Table 4 
Hierarchical regression predicting harm aversion (Study 1) 
Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 
R2 .24 .34 
Condition  -.10 -.09 
Speciesism -.49*** -.35*** 
Speciesism * Condition .33*** .25*** 
Suffering  .35*** 
Note. Displaying standardized coefficients β. Condition was coded as 1 for the humans 
condition and as 0 for all animals conditions. 
†p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
 
Table 5 
Correlations between measures (Study 1) 




Speciesism Harm av. Suffering EC OUS-IB OUS-IH 
Speciesism .35***       
Harm av. -.36*** -.43***      
Suffering -.30*** -.37*** .49***     
EC -.16*** -.35*** .32*** .26***    
OUS-IB .02 -.27*** .18*** .13*** .37***   
OUS-IH .42*** .33*** -.19*** -.16*** -.29*** .09**  
Condition -.33*** -.01 .20*** .18*** .01 .02 -.03 
Note. Condition was coded as 1 for the humans condition and as 0 for all animals conditions.   




The results of Study 1 demonstrate that people consider it significantly more wrong to 
harm a few humans to save many than to harm a few animals to save many irrespective of the 
type of animal—whether they are panda bears, dogs, squirrels, chimpanzees or pigs. This 
suggests that people have weaker deontological constraints for animals than for humans and 
are therefore more likely to be willing to sacrifice some for the greater good when confronted 
with animals than with humans. The results supported the Harm Aversion Mediated 
Speciesism Model. 
 It was, however, not the case that people considered it completely permissible to 
harm animals to save many, which is what “Utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for 
people” would suggest, nor was the strength of the constraint constant across the scenarios. 
The results therefore support the Multi-level Weighted Deontology hypothesis on which 
deontological constraints still limit the permissibility of harm to animals, but in a weaker way 
than in the human case. Note that Figure 2 reveals that, while there were large individual 
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differences in responses, only a small minority exhibited no deontological constraint at all 
against harm for animals, which is what Nozick’s slogan would predict. 
We also found that there are differences in deontological constraints people grant to 
different types of animal species. For example, people hold stronger deontological constraints 
against harming dogs (a typical pet) than pigs (a typical food animal). The results of this 
study are in line with the results of two additional versions of this study we conducted, 
reported in the Supplementary Materials, in which we only included humans, dogs, pigs, and 
chimpanzees. The fact that deontological constraints differ (even if only to a small degree) 
across different animal species is inconsistent not only with Nozick’s slogan, but also with 
the Multi-Level Uniform Deontology view. By contrast, these findings fit well with the 
Multi-level Weighted Deontology view, according to which deontological constraints get 
weighted differently depending on how much people value the respective species. 
 
Study 2: Personal vs. impersonal sacrificial dilemmas 
In Study 2, we tested whether the effect we found in Study 1—namely that people 
have weaker deontological constraints for animals than for humans—would replicate when 
relying on the traditional trolley problem. 
In a previous study, which is reported in the Supplementary Materials, we conducted 
such a study involving pigs and found that participants had weaker deontological constraints 
for pigs than for humans. In this study, by contrast, we included zebras, an animal that people 
do not classify as food but rather want to save from extinction (cf. Schubert, Caviola & 
Faber, 2019). Our hypothesis—pre-registered at https://osf.io/xsbr8—was that participants 
would find it more permissible to harm one zebra in order to save five zebras than to harm 
one human to save many humans 
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According to the dual-process model of moral judgment (Greene, 2014) an automatic 
and intuitive aversion to harm prevents more deliberate utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. 
Previous research has shown that in more personal moral dilemmas that involve direct actions 
(e.g., pushing a person off the bridge) the aversion to harm is more emotional and stronger 
compared to impersonal moral dilemmas that involve indirect actions (e.g., pushing a button; 
cf. Greene, 2014). Therefore, one possible conclusion is that harming individuals with lower 
perceived moral status, such as animals, is less personal and emotionally evocative, resulting 
in a weaker aversion to harm such individuals.  
We, therefore, looked at both personal sacrificial moral dilemmas (Footbridge / Push) 
and impersonal sacrificial moral dilemmas (Sidetrack / Switch). We intended to test whether 
deontological constraints for animals are similarly reduced in an impersonal dilemma and in a 
personal dilemma. Based on the findings of our previous study, we hypothesized that there 




We recruited 404 US American participants online via MTurk who received $0.50 
payment for their participation. Four participants were excluded for either failing to complete 
the questionnaire or for failing an attention check, leaving a final sample of 400 people (194 
females; Mage = 38.36, SD = 11.51). We aimed for a sample size of 400 participants, as our a 
priori power analysis showed that 351 participants were required to detect a medium effect 
size of f = .15, with an alpha of 0.05, and power of 0.80.  
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Design, materials and procedure 
Our study had a 2 dilemma (impersonal vs. personal) x 2 species (humans vs. zebras) 
between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly allocated to read one of four 
variants of a moral dilemma modelled after the traditional trolley problem. As a personal 
dilemma the Footbridge trolley case was used and as an impersonal the Sidetrack trolley case 
was used. After reading the dilemmas, participants responded to the same scales as in Study 
1: harm aversion (α = .95), perceived suffering capacity (α = .93), Speciesism Scale (α = .88), 
Empathic Concern Scale (α = .94), and the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS-IH α = .80; 
OUS-IB α = .79). Finally, participants responded to demographic questions. 
 
Results 
A 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA revealed two main effects but no interaction. 
Participants considered harming one zebra to save five zebras to be more permissible 
(impersonal: M = 5.03, SD = 1.66; personal: M = 3.95, SD = 1.93) than harming one human 
to save five humans (impersonal: M = 4.19, SD = 1.79; personal: M = 2.86, SD = 2.02), F(1, 
396) = 28.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. Participants also considered harming in an impersonal 
dilemma (i.e., via flipping a switch) to be more permissible than in a personal dilemma (i.e., 
via pushing off the footbridge), F(1, 396) = 41.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. However, there was no 
interaction effect between species and dilemma, F(1, 396) = 0.42, p = .52, ηp2 = .001 (Figure 
3). This means that the difference in moral permissibility between zebras and humans was 
roughly the same in both the impersonal, d = .49, p =.008 (Tukey HSD), and the personal 
dilemma, d = .60, p < .001. Similarly, the difference in moral permissibility between the 
impersonal and personal dilemmas was roughly the same both for zebras, d = .49, p =.008, 
and humans, d = .69, p < .001. 
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Figure 3. Moral permissibility of harming one individual to saving five individuals of the 
same species, ranging from 1 (Absolutely morally wrong), to 4 (Neither right nor wrong), to 
7 (Absolutely morally right). (Study 2) 
 
Participants were less harm averse for zebras (impersonal: M = 6.61, SD = 1.66; 
personal: M = 6.98, SD = 1.77) than for humans (impersonal: M = 7.63, SD = 1.64; personal: 
M = 7.82, SD = 1.59), F(1, 396) = 31.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. Harm aversion was not 
statistically significantly stronger in personal compared to impersonal dilemmas, F(1, 396) = 
2.75, p = .10, ηp2 = .007. There was also no interaction effect, F(1, 396) = 0.31, p = .58, ηp2 < 
.001. Further, participants perceived zebras (impersonal: M = 7.66, SD = 1.41; personal: M = 
7.86, SD = 1.54) to suffer less than humans (impersonal: M = 8.11, SD = 1.42; personal: M = 
8.28, SD = 1.48), F(1, 396) = 1.62, p = .20, ηp2 = .02. Suffering capacity did not differ across 
the two dilemma types, F(1, 396) = 2.75, p = .10, ηp2 = .004. There was also no interaction 
effect, F(1, 396) = 0.009, p = .92, ηp2 < .001. 
Next, we tested the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model. The relationship 
between condition and moral permissibility was mediated by harm aversion. The 
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bootstrapped indirect effect was (.93)(-.31) = -.29, 95% CI [-.44, -.16]. Thus, the indirect 
effect was statistically significant. We conducted a hierarchical regression to test which 
factors were driving harm aversion (Table 6). We found that speciesism significantly 
moderated the effect of condition onto harm aversion. The bivariate correlation between 
speciesism and harm aversion was -.18 (p = .01) in the humans condition and -.43 (p < .001) 
in the zebras condition (Table 7). In addition, perceived suffering capacity significantly 
predicted harm aversion. Thus, our model was confirmed. 
Finally, we found that the bivariate correlation between speciesism and suffering 
capacity was stronger in the zebras condition (r = -.28, p < .001) than in the humans 
condition (r = -.15, p = .04). Despite this, speciesism did not significantly moderate the effect 
of condition onto suffering capacity (β = .18, p = .14).  
 
Table 6 
Hierarchical regression predicting harm aversion (Study 2) 
Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 
R2 .17 .34 
Condition  -.02 -.01 
Speciesism -.43*** -.30*** 
Speciesism * Condition .34** .26* 
Suffering  .43*** 
Note. Displaying standardized coefficients β. Condition was coded as 1 for the humans 
condition and as 0 for the zebra condition. 
†p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
 
Table 7 
Correlations between measures (Study 2) 




Speciesism Harm av. Suffering EC OUS-IB OUS-IH 
Speciesism .18***       
Harm av. -.31*** -.30***      
Suffering -.24*** -.22*** .51***     
EC -.09† -.36*** .37*** .26***    
OUS-IB .16*** -.28*** .19*** .11* .47***   
OUS-IH .45*** .25*** -.26*** -.18*** -.15*** .15***  
Condition -.25*** -.01 .27*** .15*** -.05 -.08 .02 
Note. Condition was coded as 1 for the humans condition and as 0 for the zebras condition. 




Results from Study 2 confirm our main hypothesis that people consider it more 
permissible to harm one zebra to save five zebras than to harm one human to save five 
humans. It provides further support that people’s deontological constraints for animals are 
weaker than for humans. The results supported the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism 
Model. 
The reduction in deontological constraints for animals compared to humans was 
similarly strong in both personal and impersonal dilemmas. This is consistent with the 
findings of a previous study we conducted including pigs, which is reported in the 
Supplementary Materials. In previous research it has been argued that the difference in 
responses between personal and impersonal sacrificial dilemmas is the result of a greater 
emotional reaction in the personal case (Greene, 2014). If so, the lack of interaction could 
suggest that the mode via which one harms a few to save many (i.e., personal vs. impersonal) 
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and whether the beings at stake are animals or humans are processed independently and make 
independent contributions to the overall judgment.  
 
Study 3: Process dissociation 
In Study 3, we aimed to more directly test our hypothesis that the deontological 
aversion to harm animals is weaker than the deontological aversion to harm humans. A 
limitation of conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas is that they do not allow to clearly 
distinguish between the deontological aversion to harm the few and the utilitarian desire to 
help the many. In conventional sacrificial dilemmas these two factors are conflated because 
the deontological and utilitarian reasons are pitted against each other and result in a single 
moral judgment. In this study, we systematically teased apart the two psychological 
tendencies, namely the purely utilitarian inclination (i.e., tendency to maximize positive 
outcomes factoring out the deontological inclination to reject harm) from the purely 
deontological inclination (i.e., tendency to reject harm factoring out the utilitarian inclination 
to maximize the positive outcomes). We did this by relying on the so-called process 
dissociation technique, originally developed by Jacoby (1991) for the study of memory 
processes and more recently by Conway and Gawronski (2013) to sacrificial moral dilemmas.  
We hypothesized that in particular deontological inclinations would be reduced for 
animals compared to humans. This is because according to Multi-level Weighted 
Deontology, deontological constraints get reduced for individuals that people morally value 
less. In contrast, according to Multi-Level Uniform Deontology, utilitarianism, Cross Species 
Deontology there should be no difference in the deontological inclination towards humans 
and animals. In our previous studies, we found evidence for that based on our harm aversion 
scales. We further hypothesized that utilitarian inclinations would be affected less by the 
species-membership of the individuals because we assumed that—all else equal and without 
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any costs or counteracting harm aversion—people would have a similar desire to help many 
people as to help many animals. We also hypothesized that the more speciesist participants 
were, the lower their deontological inclinations for animals but not for humans would be.  
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 124 US American participants online via MTurk who received $0.85 
payment for their participation. Eleven participants were excluded for failing at least one 
attention check, leaving a final sample of 113 people (45 females; Mage = 38.19, SD = 10.93). 
We aimed for a sample size of 110 participants, as our a priori power analysis showed that 
110 participants were required to detect a medium effect size of f = .2, with an alpha of 0.05, 
and power of 0.80, and correction among repeated measures of 0.1 (similar to Muda, 
Niszczota, Bialek, & Conway, 2018).  
Design, materials and procedure 
The study had  two conditions (humans vs. pigs). Participants were presented with ten 
dilemmas in randomized order involving either pigs or humans. Half of the dilemmas were 
so-called incongruent dilemmas and half were so-called congruent dilemmas. In the 
incongruent dilemmas, deontology and utilitarianism prescribe diverging responses, as in the 
classic footbridge problem (e.g., kill one to save five). In the congruent dilemmas, 
deontology and utilitarianism prescribe the same responses (e.g., kill five to save one). In 
order to avoid floor effects in the congruent dilemmas, there were selfish reasons to choose 
the harmful option (e.g., winning money). The dilemmas can be found in the Supplementary 
Materials. Participants responded to each dilemma on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 
(Absolutely morally wrong) to 7 (Absolutely morally right). Responses to the congruent cases 
(α =.87) and incongruent cases (α = .89) were aggregated from the single dilemmas. 
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Participants were then presented with questions about the perceived suffering capacity 
of the respective beings (α = .97) and their aversion to harm them (α = .94). The questions 
were similar to the ones asked in the previous studies. Finally, participants responded to the 
Speciesism Scale (α = .92), the Empathic Concern Scale (α = .95), the Oxford Utilitarianism 
Scale (OUS-IH α = .82; OUS-IB α = .81), and demographic questions. 
 
Results 
In the incongruent dilemmas, moral permissibility was higher for pigs (M = 4.74, SD 
= 1.52) than for humans (M = 3.13, SD = 1.32), t(110) = 6.02, p < .001, d = 1.13. This 
replicates our core finding from the previous studies that people consider it more permissible 
to harm a few animals to save more animals than they consider it to harm a few humans to 
save more humans. In the congruent dilemmas, moral permissibility was also higher for pigs 
(M = 2.73, SD = 1.41) than for humans (M = 1.66, SD = 0.79), t(92) = 4.78, p < .001, d = .92.  
To compute the utilitarian and deontological parameters, we first transformed the 
aggregated responses on the 7-point scale into probabilities, indicating the chance that a 
participant would consider the act immoral (1 = 100%, 4 = 50%, 7 = 0%). Next, we followed 
the formula by Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) to calculate the two parameters: utilitarian 
parameter = p(immoral | congruent) – p(immoral | incongruent); deontological parameter = 
p(immoral | incongruent) / (1 – utilitarian parameter). We standardized the parameters using a 
z-transformation.  
We then conducted a 2(parameter: utilitarian vs. deontological) x 2(species: humans 
vs. pigs) repeated measures mixed-model ANOVA where the parameter factor was treated 
within-subjects and the species factor was treated between-subjects. The results revealed a 
main effect of species-membership, F(1, 222) = 5.33, p = .02, ηp2 = .02, and an interaction 
effect, F(1, 222) = 33.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .13 (Figure 4). Tukey HSD post-hoc tests revealed 
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that deontological inclinations were stronger for humans (M = 0.52, SD = 0.65) than for pigs 
(M = -0.48, SD = 1.03), p < .002, d = 1.15. The difference in utilitarian inclinations between 
humans (M = -0.23, SD = 0.86) and pigs (M = 0.21, SD = 1.08) was not statistically 
significant, p = .07, d = .44. However, there was a trend, suggesting that the utilitarian 
inclination for pigs were descriptively stronger than for humans.  
 
 
Figure 4. Standardized utilitarianism and deontology parameters for humans and pigs 
respectively (z-transformed). Participants had stronger deontological inclinations (i.e. harm-
rejection) for humans than for pigs, but they had somewhat stronger utilitarian inclinations 
(i.e. outcome-maximization) for pigs than humans. Note that the zero point is not meaningful 
due to z-transformation and that a direct comparison between the deontological and utilitarian 
parameter is not possible. (Study 3) 
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Next, we looked at correlations across conditions for the utilitarianism and 
deontology parameter separately (Table 8). In both conditions, harm aversion correlated with 
the deontological inclination but not with the utilitarian inclination. Perceived suffering 
capacity correlated with the deontological inclination for pigs but nor for humans. Perceived 
suffering capacity also did not correlate with the utilitarian inclination in either condition. As 
hypothesized, the more speciesist participants were, the weaker their deontological 
inclination for pigs. Speciesism, however, did not correlate with the deontological inclination 
for humans. Speciesism also did not correlate with the utilitarian inclination in either 
condition. Across conditions, the utilitarian inclination correlated negatively with the 
deontological inclination, r(111) = -.19, p = .046.  
 
Table 8 
Correlations with the utilitarian and deontological inclination for each condition separately 
(Study 3) 
Condition Humans Pigs 
Inclination Utilitarian Deontological Utilitarian Deontological 
Harm aversion .04 .33* .06 .43*** 
Suffering capacity  -.06 .06 .06 .33* 
Speciesism .03 -.17 -.08 -.65*** 
Empathic Concern -.02 .23† .03 .13 
OUS-IB .01 -.19 .26* -.01 
OUS-IH .44*** -.52*** .14 -.58*** 
†p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001.  
 
 
Next, we tested the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model. The relationship 
between condition (humans vs. pigs) and moral permissibility (in the incongruent dilemmas) 
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was mediated by harm aversion. The bootstrapped indirect effect was (1.51)(-.20) = -.30, 
95% CI [-.64, -.09]. Thus, the indirect effect was statistically significant. We conducted a 
hierarchical regression to test which factors were driving harm aversion (Table 9). We found 
that speciesism significantly moderated the effect of condition onto harm aversion. The 
bivariate correlation between speciesism and harm aversion was -.13 (p = .10) in the humans 
condition and -.57 (p < .001) in the pigs condition (Table 10). In addition, perceived suffering 
capacity significantly predicted harm aversion. Thus, our model was confirmed. 
Finally, we found that the bivariate correlation between speciesism and suffering 
capacity was -.25 (p = .06) in the humans condition and -.55 (p < .001) in the pigs condition. 
However, speciesism did not significantly moderate the effect of condition (humans vs. pigs) 




Hierarchical regression predicting harm aversion (Study 3) 
Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 
R2 .31 .40 
Condition  -.02 .08 
Speciesism -.56*** -.38*** 
Speciesism * Condition .47* .35† 
Suffering  .33*** 
Note. Displaying standardized coefficients β. Condition was coded as 1 for the humans 
condition and as 0 for the pigs condition. 




Correlations between measures (Study 3) 
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 z-util z-deont Speciesism Harm av. Suffering EC OUS-IB OUS-IH 
z-deont -.19†        
Speciesism -.11 -.36***       
Harm av. -.03 .50*** -.40***      
Suffering .02 .18* -.42*** .45***     
EC .01 .15 -.18† .49*** .34**    
OUS-IB .16† -.10 -.23* .20* .30** .29**   
OUS-IH .27** -.52*** .34*** -.26** -.16† -.15* .24**  
Condition -.22* .50*** < .01 .36** -.03 <. 01 -.07 -.09 
Note. Condition was coded as 1 for the humans condition and as 0 for the pigs condition. 





In Study 3, we systematically teased apart the utilitarian and deontological 
inclinations, which are conflated in conventional sacrificial dilemma analysis that we have 
relied on in the other studies. The results show that the deontological inclination is much 
stronger for humans than for pigs. The utilitarian inclination, by contrast, showed a 
descriptive trend for being stronger for pigs than for humans. Deontological inclination for 
pigs was weaker, the lower their perceived suffering capacity and the more speciesist 
participants were. Perceived suffering capacity also correlated with deontological inclination 
for humans. Speciesism, however, did not correlate with deontological inclinations for 
humans. Neither perceived suffering capacity nor speciesism correlated with utilitarian 
inclinations. The results again supported the Harm Aversion Speciesism Model. 
The finding that people had a slightly stronger utilitarian inclination for pigs than 
humans was somewhat surprising as one would expect people to have a similar desire to save 
as many humans as possible as to save as many animals as possible. One possibility is that 
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this result is related to another finding we report below (see Study 5), where we found that 
people were less likely to agree that one human is less valuable than two humans than they 
were to agree that one animal is less valuable than two animals. In other words, people may 
be less willing to maximize helping as many humans as possible than they are willing to 
maximize helping as many animals as possible (even when there is no counteracting 
deontological constraint) because they consider it less permissible to quantify and compare 
the lives of humans than the lives of animals.  
In sum, the findings of this study suggest that the fact that people are more willing to 
harm a few animals to save more animals than to harm a few humans to save more humans is 
primarily driven by a weaker deontological inclination for animals than humans. And we 
found that this reduced deontological inclinations for animals is at least partly driven by both 
perceived suffering capacity and speciesism. This is again in line with our Multi-level 
Weighted Deontology hypothesis: deontological constraints get weaker, the less people value 
the individuals; people value animals less than humans, and thus hold weaker deontological 
constraints for them. 
 
Study 4: Cross-species sacrifices 
So far, the individuals that could be saved were of the same species as those that had 
to be harmed. This means that the perceived moral status of the individuals that have to be 
harmed and those that can be saved was kept constant. In Study 4, we aim to manipulate the 
relative value of the costs and benefits. We do this by examining cross-species sacrifices, i.e., 
cases when the species-membership of the harmed and the saved individuals differs. 
According to the Multi-level Weighted Deontology model, deontological constraints are 
weaker the lower the moral status of the individual that has to be harmed. Further, the weaker 
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the deontological constraints, the stronger the comparative weight of the moral reasons to 
save the greater number. From this, we draw the following hypotheses: 
First, we would expect people to generally consider it more permissible to harm 
animals than humans irrespective of whether many animals or humans can be saved. This is 
because in both cases deontological constraints against harming animals are weaker, which 
makes it more likely for the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis to overrule them. However, since 
humans have higher moral status than animals, deontological constraints might be even easier 
to overturn if humans compared to animals can be saved.   
Second, since deontological constraints against harming humans are strong, people 
will in general consider it fairly wrong to harm humans to save either humans or animals. 
However, to the extent that people overcome their deontological constraints and do engage in 
cost-benefit analyses, these will yield opposing recommendations. Cost-benefit analysis will 
recommend harming the human to save many humans but advise against harming a human to 
save many animals. This is because most people consider one human death to be much worse 
than five pig deaths. We therefore expect an interaction effect such that the difference in 





We recruited 150 US American participants online via MTurk who received $0.90 
payment for their participation. Eight participants were excluded for failing at least one of 
two attention checks, leaving a final sample of 142 people (66 females; Mage = 38.60, SD = 
11.66). We anticipated a small to medium effect of f = .13 between animal species based on 
the results of Study 1. With an alpha of 0.05, and power of 0.80, our a priori power analysis 
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showed that we required 120 participants for a within-subjects study. To account for 
exclusions, we recruited 150 participants. 
Design, materials and procedure 
This study had a 2 harm (pigs vs. humans) x 2 save (pigs vs. humans) design. Note 
that in contrast to the previous studies, this study was conducted completely within-subjects 
to test whether the effect also holds in this set-up.  
We chose an abstract sacrificial dilemma because its briefness was well suited for this 
within-subjects design and because we expected large effects. Participants were asked to 
consider the following: “Suppose you are in a situation in which you have to decide whether 
to kill 10 individuals to save 100 individuals. If you do nothing, the 100 individuals will die. 
How morally right or wrong is it to... 1) kill 10 humans to save 100 pigs, 2) kill 10 humans to 
save 100 humans, 3) kill 10 pigs to save 100 pigs, 4) kill 10 pigs to save 100 humans?” 
Participants responded to these four questions first on a 7-point moral permissibility scale 
ranging from 1 (Absolutely morally wrong) to 7 (Absolutely morally right), and on the next 
page on a binary response measure (Wrong vs. Right). On the next pages, we included two 
new questions on moral acceptability and moral requiredness for all four conditions each to 
test whether they would yield different patterns. Next, we included an question, asking what 
minimum number of individuals would need to be saved in order to justify harming ten 
(similar to the tipping point question in Study 1). Furthermore, we included a question asking 
what maximum number of individuals could be harmed in order for it still to be justified to 
save the hundred. Participants then completed the Speciesism Scale (α = .84), the Oxford 
Utilitarianism Scale (OUS-IB α = .83; OUS-IH α = .71), and responded to demographic 
questions. 
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Results 
A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed two main effects and an interaction. 
Participants generally considered it more permissible to harm pigs than humans, F(1, 142) = 
461.72, p < .001, ηp² = .38, and generally considered it more permissible to harm an 
individual if humans could be saved than if pigs could be saved F(1, 142) = 179.63, p < .001, 
ηp² = .19. When humans had to be harmed, participants considered this much more 
permissible if this had to be done in order to save other humans (M = 4.12, SD = 1.70) than if 
it had to be done in order to save pigs (M = 1.83, SD = 1.36), p < .001, d = 1.50. But, in 
contrast, when pigs had to be harmed, participants considered this only very slightly more 
permissible if this had to be done in order to save humans (M = 5.78, SD = 1.54) than if it had 
to be done in order to save pigs (M = 5.04, SD = 1.68), p < .001, d = .47. When humans could 
be saved, participants considered it more permissible to do so by harming pigs than by 
harming humans, p < .001, d = 1.03. But when pigs could be saved, participants considered it 
even much more permissible to do so by harming pigs than by harming humans, p < .001, d = 
2.10. In short, there was a significant interaction in moral permissibility based on species 
harmed and species saved (Figure 5), F(1, 142) = 46.38, p < .001, ηp² = .06. Results for the 
moral acceptability and moral requiredness questions were in line with the main dependent 
variable (see Supplementary Materials). 
The same pattern was found for the binary morally right/wrong question: Only 4.2% 
considered it right to harm humans to save many pigs, but 51.4% considered it right to harm 
humans to save many humans. On the other hand, 80.3% considered it right to harm pigs to 
save many pigs, and 85.9% considered it right to harm pigs to save many humans. 83.8% 
participants said it would always be wrong to kill humans, no matter the number of saved 
pigs. 46.5% said it would always be wrong to kill humans, no matter the number of saved 
humans. In contrast, only 14.8% said it would always be wrong to kill pigs no matter the 
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number of saved humans. And 18.3% said it would always be wrong to kill pigs no matter the 
number of saved pigs. 
 
   
Figure 5. Moral permissibility of harming 10 individuals of a species to saving 100 of either 
the same or a different species, ranging from 1 (Absolutely morally wrong), to 4 (Neither 
right nor wrong), to 7 (Absolutely morally right). (Study 4) 
 
Discussion 
The results of this study confirm our hypothesis. People generally consider it to be 
permissible to harm animals irrespective of who will be saved—with only minor differences 
in moral permissibility depending on whether humans or animals would be saved. At the 
same time, however, people consider it impermissible to harm humans for animals, but less 
so if humans can be saved. Harming humans to save more humans—as in the traditional 
Footbridge case—remains controversial among participants. Therefore, as we predicted, the 
difference in how permissible people consider it to harm humans if either humans or animals 
can be saved is much greater than the difference in how moral people consider it to harm 
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animals if either humans or animals can be saved. Our explanation is that deontological 
constraints against harming animals are more easily overruled by utilitarian cost-benefit 
analysis than deontological constraints against harming humans. Further, in the case where 
humans have to be harmed to save many animals perhaps even cost-benefit analysis advises 
against the harmful action if people believe that 10 humans have far more value than 100 
animals.  
A limitation of this study was that it may not have been entirely clear to participants 
from the short abstract dilemmas whether the individuals that had to be killed would have 
died anyway. In all other studies we present in this paper, it was made clear that the 
individuals that have to be killed would not have died otherwise.   
 
Study 5: Between objects and humans 
Our previous studies demonstrated that people are more willing to harm a few animals 
to save many than to harm a few humans to save many. Does this mean that people see 
animals just as objects that can be sacrificed for any reason? In Study 5, we aimed to 
compare the extent to which people hold deontological constraints for humans, animals, and 
objects. In particular, our research question is whether moral permissibility of harming a few 
animals for many is closer to those of harming a few humans to save many or those of 
harming (or destroying) a few objects to save many.  
Nozick (1974) hypothesized that people view animals as belonging into a moral 
category between humans and objects. On the one hand, Nozick reasoned, in some ways we 
treat animals like objects. We consider it permissible to own animals or to harm them for the 
greater good—something most people now consider to be wrong if it involved humans. On 
the other hand, since animals can suffer, there are many things we are not allowed to do with 
animals that we are allowed to do with objects. For example, while it may be permissible to 
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harm animals for the greater good, it is generally not permissible to unnecessarily harm 
animals for weaker reasons such as for pure personal pleasure. With objects, however, people 
appear to mostly consider it permissible to do with them whatever one wants as long as 
nobody gets hurt or nobody’s property rights are violated. A study by Nichols & Mallon, 
(2006), however, suggested that people apply very weak deontological constraints even to 
objects. They reported that people apply deontological constraints even to inanimate objects, 
albeit very weakly: while people did not consider it overall wrong to destroy one object to 
prevent several objects from being destroyed in a Footbridge-like scenario, they did agree 
that a moral rule was broken in such a case. 
Our hypothesis, which we pre-registered at https://osf.io/aeu3g/, was that people’s 
views about the moral permissibility of harming animals lie somewhere between their views 
about the moral permissibility of harming (or destroying) humans and objects. This is 
because, according to the Multi-level Weighted Deontology model, we hypothesize that 
people have extremely weak deontological constraints for objects, somewhat weak 
constraints for animals and strong constraints for humans. 
The philosopher Martha Nussbaum (1995) has identified a number of dimensions of 
objectification, such as ownership, instrumentality, denial of autonomy or fungibility 
(interchangeability). Based on this, we hypothesized these are applied to objects as well as, to 
some extent, to animals. People are likely to agree that objects are interchangeable, i.e., that 
one could easily replace one chair or toothbrush by another if they are similar and that they 
can be owned. The same does not apply to humans since every human is seen as being 
unique, whereas animals might be in a moral category in between humans and objects. 
Similarly, people are likely to agree that one object is less valuable than two. In contrast, 
people are often unwilling to agree that one human is less valuable than two. Again, we 
hypothesize that animals are in an intermediate moral position. Overall, we expect that moral 
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permissibility of harming a few to save many might track views on interchangeability and 
comparability of these objects. This is because harming a few to save many is only a 
permissible option if one believes that the respective entities are in principle interchangeable 




We recruited 603 US American participants online via MTurk who received $0.72 
payment for their participation. Forty-six were excluded for failing at least one attention 
check, leaving a final sample of 557 people (299 females; Mage = 38.39, SD = 11.77). We 
expected a small to medium effect size. Our analysis showed that 576 participants were 
required to detect an effect size of f = .13 with an alpha of 0.05, power of 0.80, and 3 groups. 
We aimed to recruit 600 participants to account for any exclusions.  
Design, materials and procedure 
This study had a between-subjects design with three conditions: humans, animals, and 
objects. Each participant received two vignettes in random order. The reason we chose two 
was because we knew from Study 1 that there can be differences between different types of 
animals. Similarly, we believed that there could be small differences between high and low 
value objects (cf. Mallon & Nichols, 2006). The two vignettes participants received involved 
adults and children in the humans condition, dogs and pigs in the animals condition, and 
paintings and chairs in the objects condition. We were primarily interested in the average 
effects, which is why we aimed to take the mean of the responses to the two vignettes in each 
condition as the main dependent variable. The vignettes were based on our vaccine dilemma 
from the previous studies but were slightly adapted to ensure plausibility and consistency 
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across the three conditions. Similar to the vaccine dilemma we used in Study 1, in each 
dilemma the entities that had to be harmed (or destroyed) were of the same type as the 
entities that could be saved (e.g., destroy 10 paintings to prevent 100 paintings from getting 
destroyed). 
After completing the main task, which involved indicating their moral permissibility 
ratings about harming a few to prevent similar harm to many in two separate vignettes, 
participants were presented with short additional questions. First, participants were asked 
whether they consider it morally acceptable to kill a pig or a human/destroy a chair if one has 
a strong personal preference to do so. Second, they were asked whether they consider it 
acceptable to own a chair, pig or human. Third, they were asked whether they think a chair, 
pig or human can easily be replaced by another one (interchangeability). Fourth, they were 
asked whether they believe one chair, pig, or human is less valuable than two 
(comparability). Next, participants were explicitly asked to indicate on a slider what moral 
value they attribute to animals relative to objects (-50) and humans (+50). Finally, 
participants completed the Speciesism Scale (α =.86), the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS-
IB α = .79; OUS-IH α = .76), and responded to demographic questions. 
 
Results 
Within each condition, moral permissibility of the two vignettes correlated strongly 
with each other (humans: r(187) = 0.95, p < .001; animals: r(189) = .87, p < .001; objects: 
r(175) = .74, p < .001). Therefore, the responses of the two vignettes in each condition were 
averaged to form a single score. Further analysis revealed that if the two vignettes were 
analyzed separately, the overall pattern of the results remained the same. The following 
analyses are based on the aggregated scores only.  
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A one-way ANOVA revealed that there were significant differences across the three 
conditions in moral permissibility, F(2, 554) = 105.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .28 (Figure 6; Table 
11). And as in our previous studies, participants considered it more permissible to harm a few 
animals to save many animals (M = 4.70, SD = 1.66) than to harm a few humans to save (M = 
3.28, SD = 2.00), p < .001, d = .78. Participants considered it more permissible to destroy a 
few objects in order to prevent more objects from being destroyed (M = 5.83, SD = 1.28) than 
to harm a few animals to save more animals, p < .001, d = .75. Accordingly, the difference in 
moral permissibility between the objects and humans condition was very large, p < .001, d = 
1.51. 
 
    
Figure 6. Moral permissibility of harming (or destroying) 10 humans, animals, or objects to 
save 100 of the same type, ranging from 1 (Absolutely morally wrong), to 4 (Neither right 
nor wrong), to 7 (Absolutely morally right). (Study 5) 
 
Table 11 
Descriptive statistics of moral permissibility and scales (Study 5) 
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 Humans Animals Objects 
Harming a few to save many  3.28 (2.00) 4.70 (1.66) 5.83 (1.28) 
Harming for personal preference 1.56 (1.23) 3.16 (1.72) 4.95 (1.53) 
Owning 1.43 (1.07) 5.76 (1.24) 6.47 (0.9) 
Replacing with another (interchangeability) 1.75 (1.19) 4.46 (1.7) 5.98 (1.03) 
One less valuable than two (comparability) 2.35 (1.66) 4.48 (1.83) 5.36 (1.60) 
Note. M (SD) ratings on a scale from  1 (Absolutely morally wrong) to 7 (Absolutely morally 
right) for the first row and from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) for the remaining 
rows. 
   
Next, we looked at the other dependent measures. For all four questions we found the 
same pattern, with animals being in a category between humans and objects (Table 11). First, 
participants thought it was permissible to destroy a chair if one has a strong preference to do 
so, but it was somewhat wrong to harm a pig if one has a strong preference to do so, and very 
wrong to harm a human if one has a strong preference to do so. Second, participants thought 
it was permissible to own a chair, as well as a pig—even though somewhat less—but they 
thought it was wrong to own a human. Third, they thought that a chair could easily be 
replaced by another one, whereas a human could not be replaced by another human. For pigs, 
they thought it was somewhat possible to replace a pig with another one. Fourth, participants 
agreed that one chair was less valuable than two, slightly agreed that one pig was less 
valuable than two, but strongly disagreed that one human was less valuable than two. When 
asked explicitly what the moral value of animals relative to humans and objects were, 
participants stated that they consider animals to be closer to humans with a mean of 23.68 
(SD = 23.54) on a scale from -50 (objects) to +50 (humans), which was significantly above 
the mid-point 0, t(556) = 23.74, p < .001, d = 1.01.  
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Discussion 
This study showed that people place animals into a moral category between objects 
and humans. People have very strong deontological constraints for humans, relatively weak 
ones for animals, and extremely weak ones, at best, for objects. These findings support the 
Multi-level Weighted Deontology model. They suggest that there is a hierarchy of moral 
levels, and that deontological constraints do not disappear as we move down the levels but 
just get weaker. It is noteworthy that while the modal response in the objects condition was 7 
(i.e., no deontological constraints at all), a considerate number of participants (155 out of 
177) chose values below 7. And while this could be partly be explained by noise, it is also 
possible that some people still hold weak deontological constraints for objects.  
Similar patterns were found on views about harming for idiosyncratic reasons, 
ownership, interchangeability, and comparability. Participants considered it wrong to own 
humans, but morally acceptable to own animals and objects. They considered it very wrong 
to harm humans to fulfil a personal preference, fairly wrong to harm animals to fulfil a 
personal preference but morally acceptable to harm objects to fulfil a personal preference. 
Furthermore, we found that deontological constraints against harming for the greater good 
may be related with—or even underpinned by—views on interchangeability and 
comparability of the respective entities. Participants disagreed that humans can easily be 
exchanged by other humans or that one human life is less valuable than two. At the same 
time, they had strikingly different views about objects: they believed that objects can easily 
be replaced by other objects and that one object is clearly less valuable than two objects. 
Again, animals were placed in an intermediate position with regard to these two aspects. 
Thus, our results suggest that only if one believes that an entity can be compared with and 
replaced by other similar entities, is it seen as sensible to harm one such entity to save many.  
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Study 6: Time investment and donations 
The previous studies focused on judgments in hypothetical scenarios and were 
presented to online samples on MTurk. In Study 6, we aimed to replicate the effect with an 
offline student sample with two goals: first, to show that the effect shows in the real-world 
context of medical experimentation; second, to show that the hypothetical judgments we 
studied so far translate into concrete behavior. In the real world, harming animals to benefit 
others is common in the context of medical experimentation. The general societal consensus 
is that medical experimentation on animals, even if harmful, is justified whereas on humans it 
is not—in particular if no consent is given by the humans. 
In this study, we asked students on the University of Oxford campus about their 
opinion on the ethical permissibility of medical experiments on pigs or human infants. In 
addition to measuring their opinions in the form of judgments, we also aimed to measure 
behavior. For that, we gave them the possibility to invest their personal time to help improve 
the campaign of an activist organization that was fighting against the proposed medical 
research program on pigs or infants. Furthermore, participants had the option of donating 
personal money to support the activist organization if they wished to do so. Our hypothesis 
was that we would replicate the effect found in the previous studies for the judgment as well 
as behavioral measures. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 208 students on the campus of the University of Oxford who received 
£3 payment (in line with UK minimum wage) for their participation. Eight were excluded 
because they did not complete an attention check or did not finish the study, leaving a final 
sample of 200 people (118 females; Mage = 24.31, SD = 7.68). Power analysis showed that 
197 participants were required to detect an effect size of f = .2, which we determined in an 
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online pilot study, with an alpha of 0.05, and power of 0.80. We aimed to recruit 200 
participants to account for any exclusions.  
Design, materials, and procedure  
The study had two between-subjects conditions. Participants first read a text about a 
planned medical experiment at the university’s medical science lab. The research was 
described as involving experimentation on either 50 young pigs or human infants, depending 
on the condition, in order to develop a medicine that would help thousands of sick pigs or 
human infants. The text stated that while the research could be painful for the test subjects, it 
would not have any long-term negative side effects. Next, participants were informed that 
due to ethical concerns of this planned medical research program the advocacy group 
Unethical Research Watch plans to fight against the implementation of the research. In order 
to do so, the advocacy group asked us to conduct a survey to assess the opinions of the 
general public, whose results will inform their campaign. As part of this alleged survey, 
participants were asked to indicate whether they consider the planned research program to be 
ethically justified or not, and whether they would like it to stop. On the next page, 
participants were told that if they shared the advocacy group’s view and wanted to support 
their campaign, they could do so by completing a short writing task. In particular, participants 
were told that the advocacy group is looking for the best arguments to support their view, 
which they could write down on the paper if they wished to support the campaign, and that 
we would forward their responses to the advocacy group in order for them to improve their 
campaign. Finally, participants were also given the opportunity to donate any amount 
between 0 and 300 pennies of their £3 payment to support the advocacy group. 
Participants also completed the Speciesism Scale (α = .73) and Oxford Utilitarianism 
Scale (OUS-IH α = .80; OUS-IB α = .71), as well as demographic questions. At the end of 
the study, participants were debriefed about the fact that both the planned medical research 
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program as well as the advocacy group were made up. Participants kept the money that they 
intended to donate. 
 
Results 
Participants considered the proposed medical research program significantly more 
ethically justified if it involved pigs (M = 5.39; SD = 1.34) compared to human infants (M = 
4.34; SD = 1.77; Figure 7), t(183) = -4.71, p < .001, d = .67. Similarly, they were 
significantly more likely to say that they wanted the program to stop if it involved infants (M 
= 3.49; SD = 1.88) compared to pigs (M = 2.69; SD = 1.50), t(189) = 3.35, p < .001, d = .48. 
Next, we looked at the behavioral measures. Significantly more participants were willing to 
invest time to help to support the campaign of the activist organization fighting against the 
medical research program if the research involved human infants (38%) than pigs (19%), 
χ²(1) = 7.71, p = .005. Finally, participants also donated significantly more money (pennies) 
to support the activist group if the research involved human infants (M = 51.52; SD = 107.96) 
than pigs (M = 21.15; SD = 70.27), t(169) = 2.34, p = .02, d = .33. Since donations were not 
normally distributed, we conducted a Wilcoxon rank test, which supported the finding, W = 
5348.5, p = .03.  
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Figure 7. Moral permissibility of the medical research program that harms pigs to save many 
more pigs or human infants to save many more human infants, ranging from 1 (Completely 
unjustified), to 4 (Neither justified nor unjustified), to 7 (Completely justified). (Study 6) 
 
Discussion 
This study replicated the effect we found in the previous studies in an offline student 
sample, namely that people have weaker deontological constraints for animals than for 
humans. This shows that the effect exists in the real-world context of medical 
experimentation and, crucially, that it translates into behavior. People were more willing to 
invest both their time and personal money to support an activist campaign against medical 
research on human infants than on pigs. Nevertheless, there was some degree of opposition to 
research on animals even when this would help thousands of other animals. This is in line 
with the Multi-level Weighted Deontology model that suggests that deontological constraints 
get weaker, but do not disappear, the lower the perceived moral status of the respective 
individual.  
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Figure 7 suggests that responses in the infants condition were bi-modal. While one 
group of participants considered the medical research program mostly justifiable, another 
group considered it mostly unjustifiable. In the pigs condition, in contrast, all participants 
considered it justifiable. Since we did not find the same bi-modal pattern in any of our 
previous studies, it is likely that the pattern is specific to this study. It may be that some 
participants considered this particular medical research project less harmful than others. One 
possible reason is that the ratio of harmed and help beings was bigger (harm fifty to help 
thousands) in this study than in previous studies (e.g., harm ten to help one hundred). 
 
Study 7: Social connectedness 
While we found support for the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model in our 
previous studies, it might be objected that this model leaves out a potentially important 
factor. That is the possibility that people are more willing to harm animals because they feel 
less socially connected to them (Petrinovich et al., 1993). Since people generally feel less 
socially connected to animals than to other humans, this possibility offers an alternative 
explanation of the effect we observed in the previous studies. In Study 7, we tested this 
hypothesis.  
To test that whether social connectedness could explain our effect, we employed a 2 
species (humans vs. dogs) x 2 social connectedness (close vs. distant) between-subjects study 
design. Our hypothesis was that participants would continue to hold stronger deontological 
constraints against harming dogs than humans even when social connectedness is held 
constant. 
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Method 
Participants 
We recruited 302 US American participants online via MTurk who received $0.40 
payment for their participation. One participant was excluded for failing an attention check, 
leaving a final sample of 301 people (143 females; Mage = 41.69, SD = 12.85). We aimed for 
a sample size of 300 participants, as our a priori power analysis showed that 301 participants 
were required to detect a medium effect size of f = .18, with an alpha of 0.05, and power of 
0.80. 
Design, materials, and procedure  
Participants in the close conditions were first told that they should imagine that all six 
people (or dogs) described in the scenario were their own brothers (or dogs) that they care 
very much about. In the distant conditions, they were told to imagine that all six people (or 
dogs) came from a country far away, that they have never met them before and will never 
meet them again in the future. Then participants were presented with a moral dilemma similar 
to the vaccine dilemma used in Study 1 in which they were asked whether they would 
actively infect one unaffected individual, and by doing so killing it, in order to save five 
others of the same type. Like in Study 1, participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (Absolutely morally wrong) to 7 (Absolutely morally right). 
On the next pages, participants were presented with follow-up questions. First, we 
measured perceived social connectedness (α = .99), which served as a manipulation check 
using three items, such as “How socially connected do you feel with the brothers / strangers / 
dogs (described in the previous scenario)?” on 9-point response scale from not at all socially 
connected to extremely socially connected. Next, we measured harm aversion (α = .95) and 
perceived suffering capacity (α = .92) adjusted to the respective experimental condition with 
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similar measures as in Studies 1 and 2. Finally, participants responded to the Speciesism 
Scale (α = .88), the Empathic Concern Scale (α = .94), and demographic questions. 
 
Results 
A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect for the species factor but neither main 
effect for the social connectedness nor an interaction effect (Table 12). In line with our 
previous studies, participants considered it significantly more permissible to harm one dog to 
save five dogs than to harm one human to save many humans, F(1, 297) = 31.10, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .09 (Figure 8). The social connectedness factor made no difference, F(1, 297) = 0.02, p 
= .90, ηp2 < .001. Participants considered it roughly equally permissible to harm their own 
brother to save five other brothers as to harm a stranger to save five strangers, p = 0.79, d = 
.14. Similarly, participants considered it roughly equally permissible to harm their own dog 
to save five other own dogs as to harm a dog they don’t know to save five other dogs they 
don’t know, p = .69, d = .19. As such, there was no significant interaction effect between 
species and social connectedness, F(1, 297) = 2.02, p = .16, ηp2 = .006. 
Social connectedness ratings were significantly lower (i.e., less close) in the distant 
compared to in the close conditions, F(1, 297) = 241.73, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.45, which serves as 
a manipulation check. They were also lower for humans than dogs, F(1, 297) = 11.68, p < 
.001, ηp2 = 0.04. And the difference in perceived social connectedness between brothers and 
strangers was greater than the difference in perceived social connectedness between one’s 
own dogs and dogs one doesn’t know, F(1, 297) = 7.64, p  = .006, ηp2 = .03. 
Harm aversion ratings were stronger in the close compared to the distant conditions, 
F(1, 297) = 15.82, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.05.  Harm aversion for dogs was weaker than harm 
aversion for humans, F(1, 297) = 4.89, p = .03, ηp2 = 0.02. There was no significant 
interaction effect for harm aversion, F(1, 297) = 2.72, p = .10, ηp2 = .009. Suffering capacity 
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ratings were lower for dogs than for humans, F(1, 297) = 12.70, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.04. There 
was neither an effect of social connectedness on suffering capacity, F(1, 297) = 1.74, p = .19, 
ηp2 =.005, nor was there a significant interaction effect for suffering capacity, F(1, 297) = 
0.50, p = .48, ηp2 = .002. 
 
Table 12 
Descriptive statistics of moral permissibility and scales (Study 7) 
Species Humans Dogs 
Social connectedness Close Distant Close Distant 
Moral permissibility 3.32 (1.97) 3.04 (1.95) 4.22 (1.78) 4.55 (1.81) 
Social connectedness 7.28 (2.15) 2.67 (2.11) 7.45 (1.87) 4.23 (2.53) 
Harm aversion 7.71 (1.88) 7.22 (1.87) 7.60 (1.55) 6.41 (1.98) 
Suffering capacity 7.4 (1.37) 7.29 (1.60) 6.87 (1.75) 6.50 (1.71) 
Note. M (SD) Moral permissibility on a scale from 1 (wrong) to 7 (right), social 
connectedness on a scale from 1 (distant) to 9 (close), harm aversion on a scale from 1 
(mild) to 9 (maximum), suffering capacity on a scale from 1 (mild) to 9 (maximum). 
Displayed results for social connectedness, harm aversion and suffering capacity are 
aggregated responses of three items each. 
 
 
HARMING ANIMALS AND HUMANS                                             57 
 
Figure 8. Moral permissibility of harming one to save five individuals, ranging from 1 
(Absolutely morally wrong), over 4 (Neither right nor wrong), to 7 (Absolutely morally 
right). Close humans were described as one’s own brothers, close dogs as one’s own dogs, 
distant humans as strangers, distant dogs as dogs one does not know. (Study 7) 
 
Next, we tested the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model. The relationship 
between condition (humans vs. dogs) and moral permissibility was mediated by harm 
aversion. The bootstrapped indirect effect was (.47)(-.19) = -.09, 95% CI [-.21, -.02]. Thus, 
the indirect effect was statistically significant. We conducted a hierarchical regression to test 
which factors were driving harm aversion (Table 13). We found that speciesism did not 
significantly moderate the effect of condition onto harm aversion. The bivariate correlation 
between speciesism and harm aversion was -.13 (p = .10) in the humans condition and -.25 (p 
= .001) in the dogs condition (Table 14). However, perceived suffering capacity significantly 
predicted harm aversion. Thus, our model was only partly supported. 
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Finally, we found that the bivariate correlation between speciesism and suffering 
capacity was stronger in the dogs condition (r = -.32, p < .001) than in the humans condition 
(r = -.14, p = .09). Speciesism significantly moderated the effect of condition onto suffering 
capacity (β = .34, p = .03).  
 
Table 13 
Hierarchical regression predicting harm aversion (Study 7) 
Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 
R2 .10 .36 
Condition (Species) -.06 -.02 
Social connectedness .23*** .18*** 
Speciesism -.29*** -.10 
Speciesism * Condition .24 .05 
Suffering  .54*** 
Note. Displaying standardized coefficients β. Condition was coded as 1 for humans and as 0 
for dogs. Social connectedness was coded as 1 for close and as 0 for distant. 
†p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
 
Table 14 




Speciesism Harm av. Suffering EC 
Speciesism .09     
Harm av. -.21*** -.18***    
Suffering -.36*** -.21*** .58***   
EC -.07 -.20*** .25*** .19***  
Condition -.31*** .08 .12* .20*** -.01 
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Note. Condition was coded as 1 for humans and as 0 for dogs. 




The results of this study suggest that social connectedness cannot explain why people 
hold weaker deontological constraints for animals than humans. Instead, other factors 
associated with species-membership or species-membership itself must explain it. This 
suggests that the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model does not need to be extended 
by including a social connectedness factor. 
Despite this, the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model was only partly 
supported by our results. Similar to Studies 1, 2, and 3, we found that harm aversion 
mediated the effect of condition to moral permissibility. And we again found that perceived 
suffering capacity drove harm aversion. However, in contrast to the previous studies, we 
found no significant moderation of speciesism on the relationship between condition and 
harm aversion. One possible explanation is that we used dogs in the current study. Recent 
research has shown that even speciesists can have a strong emotional attachment to dog, a 
paradigmatic pet animal (Caviola & Capraro, 2020)—especially if it is their own dog. Thus, 
the effect of speciesism on the aversion to harming dogs might be less pronounced than its 
effect on the aversion to harming other animals, such as pigs. Indeed, in Study 1 we found 
that the moderation effect was weaker for dogs than for pigs. It thus may well be that the 
effect would have been significant had we used pigs instead of dogs. However, since the 
correlation between speciesism and aversion to harm dogs was stronger (r = -.25) than 
between speciesism and aversion to harm humans (r = -.13), it is also possible that a 
moderation effect could be detected with a higher sample size. Either way, the results of this 
study demonstrate the robust relationship between species-membership, perceived suffering 
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capacity, and harm aversion, which determines moral permissibility of harming a few for the 
greater good. Finally, despite the fact that speciesism did not significantly moderate the effect 
of condition onto harm aversion, it did significantly moderate the effect of condition onto 
perceived suffering capacity. That is, the more speciesist participants were the weaker they 
perceived the suffering capacity of dogs to be, which could in turn lead to reduced aversion to 
harm dogs.    
Kurzban, DeScioli and Fein (2012) found that people are more willing to harm their 
brother to save five brothers than they are to harm a stranger to save five strangers. In our 
study, we did not replicate these findings. Despite the fact that participants rated their social 
connection to the strangers as much more distant than to their brothers (as per our 
manipulation check), participants considered it equally permissible to harm one brother to 
save five brothers than to harm one stranger to save five strangers. One might even wonder 
whether Multi-level Weighted Deontology would not predict that people should have weaker 
deontological constraints for strangers than for brothers, since people arguably care more 
about their brothers. However, it is unlikely that people believe that their brothers have a 
higher moral status than other human beings in an absolute sense. Instead, they rather believe 
that they have a special obligation to their brothers than to strangers. It is possible to believe 
that one has special (agent-relative) obligations to certain people while still believing that all 
people have the same absolute moral status, and that they therefore possess the same rights. 
By contrast, as we have shown in other work, people—at least to some extent—believe that 
humans have a higher moral status than animals in an absolute sense (Caviola et al., 2020). 
 
Study 8: Cognitive capacity and ‘marginal cases’ 
Humans typically possess a more advanced cognitive capacity than animals. In 
philosophical discussion, the advanced cognitive capacity of humans—enabling language 
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use, complex thought, and explicit reasoning and deliberation—is often seen as the basis for 
rational agency or ‘personhood’ and thus as a central source of moral status. On Kant’s view, 
which we discussed earlier (Kant, 1785), rational agency is the only basis for moral status. 
But even those who reject Kant’s extreme view often accept that rational agency endows a 
being with superior moral status and is the only basis for moral rights, including 
deontological protections against being harmed in order to promote a greater good (cf. Gruen, 
2017). It is thus possible that people grant humans stronger deontological constraints because 
they possess such an advanced cognitive capacity that animals lack. In Study 8, we tested this 
hypothesis. 
One way to test this hypothesis is to look at so-called ‘marginal cases’, as they are 
used in philosophical discussions (Singer, 1993). These are cases in which humans, such as 
infants or cognitively severely impaired people, have a cognitive capacity that is similar to, or 
even lower than, that of some animals. If it can be demonstrated that people grant stronger 
deontological constraints to humans than animals, even when these humans have lower 
cognitive capacity than the respective animals, this would suggest that cognitive capacity 
cannot be a sufficient explanation of the effect in question. In our study, we made use of such 
marginal cases in our experimental paradigm. Those who appeal to this example tend to 
interpret the prioritization of marginal cases over animals as showing that people are 




We recruited 238 US American participants online via MTurk who received $0.45 
payment for their participation. Five participants were excluded for failing an attention check, 
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leaving a final sample of 233 people (94 females; Mage = 37.69, SD = 10.99). We aimed for a 
sample size of at least 210 participants.  
Design, materials and procedure 
Participants were again presented with a modified version of the vaccine dilemma 
from the previous study. There were two conditions: patients and chimpanzees. In the 
chimpanzees condition, participants were asked to imagine a scenario where there are two 
shelters that host chimpanzees. The chimpanzees were described as being relatively 
intelligent, in comparison to other animals: as having ways of communicating and of forming 
social relationships, and as being able, in a limited way, to plan for the future and make 
autonomous, informed decisions. It was also stated that some researchers believe that 
chimpanzees are self-aware. In the patients conditions, participants were asked to imagine 
that there are two clinics that host severely cognitively impaired humans. These humans were 
described as having very limited intelligence, even lower than those of the chimpanzees in 
the other condition. Finally, in both conditions it was made clear that the chimpanzees (or 
patients, respectively) are capable of experiencing physical and emotional pain. Next, as in 
our prior vaccine dilemmas, participants were asked whether they consider it morally right or 
wrong to actively kill 10 unaffected chimpanzees (patients) to save 100 other chimpanzees 
(patients) on a 7-point scale. 
Participants were then presented with questions about the perceived cognitive 
capacity (intelligence, rationality, and capability of planning into the future; α = .93) of the 
respective beings, their perceived suffering capacity (α = .96) and aversion to harm these 
beings (α = .91). Finally, participants responded to the Speciesism Scale (α = .90), the 
Empathic Concern Scale (α = .89), and demographic questions. 
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Results 
Chimpanzees were perceived to have a higher cognitive capacity (M = 6.01; SD = 
1.50) than severely cognitively impaired humans (M = 3.74, SD = 2.38), t(196) = 8.76, p < 
.001, d = 1.45, which served as a manipulation check. Participants considered it more 
permissible to harm ten chimpanzees in order to save 100 chimpanzees (M = 4.43, SD = 1.79) 
than to harm 10 severely cognitively impaired humans to save 100 severely cognitively 
impaired humans (M = 3.47, SD = 2.02; Figure 9), t(228) = 3.85, p < .001, d = .50. Harm 
aversion for chimpanzees (M = 6.62; SD = 1.78) was significantly lower than for patients (M 
= 7.10, SD = 1.85), t(231) = -2.01, p = .045, d = .26. Perceived suffering capacity for 
chimpanzees (M = 5.20, SD = 2.51) was not significantly different than for patients (M = 
5.11, SD = 2.57), t(231) = 0.27, p = .79, d = .04.  
 
   
Figure 9. Moral permissibility of harming ten chimpanzees to save a hundred chimpanzees or 
of harming ten severely cognitively impaired humans (with a lower cognitive capacity than 
the chimpanzees) to save a hundred severely cognitively impaired humans, ranging from 1 
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(Absolutely morally wrong), over 4 (Neither right nor wrong), to 7 (Absolutely morally 
right). (Study 8) 
Next, we tested the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model. The relationship 
between condition (patients vs. chimpanzees) and moral permissibility was mediated by harm 
aversion. The bootstrapped indirect effect was (.48)(-.31) = -.15, 95% CI [-.33, -.02]. Thus, 
the indirect effect was statistically significant. We conducted a hierarchical regression to test 
which factors were driving harm aversion (Table 15). We found that speciesism significantly 
moderated the effect of condition onto harm aversion. The bivariate correlation between 
speciesism and harm aversion was -.20 (p = .03) in the cognitively impaired humans 
condition and -.43 (p < .001) in the chimpanzee condition (Table 16). In addition, both 
perceived suffering capacity (positively) and perceived cognitive capacity (negatively) 
predicted harm aversion. Thus, the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model was 
confirmed. 
Finally, we found that the bivariate correlation between speciesism and perceived 
cognitive capacity was -.14 (p < .12) in the chimpanzees condition and .41 (p < .001) in the 
humans condition. Speciesism significantly moderated the effect of condition onto perceived 
cognitive capacity (β = .68, p < .001). And we found that the bivariate correlation between 
speciesism and suffering capacity was -.09 (p = .33) in the chimpanzees condition and .16 (p 
= .08) in the humans condition. Speciesism did not significantly moderate the effect of 




Hierarchical regression predicting harm aversion (Study 8) 
Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 
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R2 .11 .16 
Condition  -.15 -.26 
Speciesism -.43*** -.42*** 
Speciesism * Condition .30† .34* 
Suffering  .20* 
Cognitive capacity  -.16* 
Note. Displaying standardized coefficients β. Condition was coded as 1 for cognitively 
impaired humans and as 0 for chimpanzees. 




Correlations between measures (Study 8)  
 Permissibi
lity 
Speciesism Harm av. Suffering Cogn. 
capacity 
EC 
Speciesism .31***      
Harm av. -.32*** -.32***     
Suffering -.04 .04 .18**    
Cogn. 
Capacity 
.43*** .20*** -.17** .17**   
EC -.25*** -.43*** .26*** -.02 -.18**  
Condition -.25*** -.07 .13* -.02 -.50*** .11† 
Note. Condition was coded as 1 for cognitively impaired humans and as 0 for chimpanzees. 




This study showed that people hold stronger deontological constraints against 
harming humans than against harming animals even in cases where they perceive the humans 
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to have lower cognitive capacity than the animals. In line with the Harm Aversion Mediated 
Speciesism Model, participants were more averse to harm the humans than the chimpanzees. 
This was the case despite the fact that people perceived them both to be similarly capable of 
suffering. We also found, in line with the model’s predictions, that speciesism moderated the 
effect of condition onto harm aversion. That is, the more speciesist participants were, the less 
averse they were to harm the chimpanzees in particular. In line with the model, perceived 
suffering capacity and perceived cognitive capacity were also significant predictors of harm 
aversion. Overall, these results confirm our model. They show that the reduced harm aversion 
for animals is multiply determined and cannot be fully explained by perceived cognitive 
capacity alone. 
 
Study 9: Cognitive capacity in a hypothetical species 
In Study 8 we found that people hold stronger deontological constraints against 
harming humans than animals even in cases where they perceive the humans to have a lower 
cognitive capacity than the animals. This suggests that other factors must explain the effect. 
However, it does not rule out that cognitive capacity still partly contributes to the effect. In 
Study 9, we examined whether cognitive capacity partly drives deontological constraints 
against harm if everything else—including species—is held constant.  
To test this, we presented participants with scenarios involving a hypothetical 
extraterrestrial species who either had advanced or basic cognitive capacity and who either 
had a low or a high degree of suffering capacity. Our study was inspired by a study 
conducted by Sytsma and Machery (2012) who found that participants considered it more 
wrong to harm cognitively advanced, compared to cognitively basic, beings to benefit 
humans.  
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 Our hypothesis, which we pre-registered at https://osf.io/24vwr/, was that participants 
consider harming individuals with an advanced cognitive capacity (just like humans) to be 
wrong but individuals with a basic cognitive capacity (just like animals) to be generally 
permissible. In addition, we also manipulated suffering capacity. We hypothesized that 
participants consider harming individuals with a high suffering capacity to be more morally 




We recruited 812 US participants online via MTurk who received $0.5 payment for 
their participation. One hundred and eighty-seven were excluded for failing at least one 
attention check or manipulation check, leaving a final sample of 625 people (307 females; 
Mage = 35.72, SD = 11.30). We expected a small effect size. Our analysis showed that 787 
participants were required to detect an effect size of f = .1 with an alpha of 0.05, and power of 
0.80. We aimed to recruit 800 participants to account for any exclusions.  
Design, materials, and procedure  
The study had a 2 (cognitive capacity: basic vs. advanced) x 2 (suffering capacity: 
low vs. high) study design with both factors being manipulated between subjects. This study 
design and stimulus were loosely based on the study by Sytsma and Machery (2012). 
Participants read a fictional paragraph about a planet on a nearby solar system on which 
extraterrestrial individuals called ‘Atlans’ are the dominant form of life. Participants then 
read one of four descriptions of the Atlans depending on condition. The Atlans were 
described as either having suffering capacity (“feel pleasure and pain as well as other 
emotions such as fear, anger and sadness”) or as having no suffering capacity (“don’t feel 
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pleasure or pain or any other emotions such as fear, anger, or sadness”). Further, they were 
described as either having an advanced cognitive capacity (“have opinions, beliefs, desires, 
language, and culture. […] can make decisions for themselves. […] make plans for their 
long-term future”) or as having a basic cognitive capacity (“don’t have opinions, beliefs, 
desires, language, or culture, […] respond to their environment purely based on impulse and 
instinct […] don’t make plans for their long-term”). 
Following these descriptions, participants were given the vaccine scenario from Study 
1, according to which ten healthy Atlans needed to be killed to develop a vaccine to save a 
hundred other Atlans from dying of a disease. Next, participants responded to manipulation 
check questions, which tested whether they correctly understood and remembered what 
cognitive capacity level or suffering capacity level the extraterrestrials had. Finally, 
participants completed the Speciesism Scale (α = .88), the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS-
IH α = .78; OUS-IB α = .73), and answered demographic questions. 
 
Results 
A two-way ANOVA revealed that participants considered it more permissible to harm 
ten individuals to save a hundred individuals when these individuals had a basic cognitive 
capacity compared to if they had an advanced cognitive capacity, F(1, 621) = 10.56, p = .001, 
ηp2 = .02 (Figure 10). However, the level of suffering capacity made no difference on moral 
judgements, F(1, 621) = 0.34, p = 0.56, ηp2 = .001, nor was there an interaction between 
cognitive capacity and suffering capacity F(1, 621) = 0.06, p = .80, ηp2 < .001. In post-hoc 
tests moral permissibility ratings for individuals without suffering capacity that either were 
cognitively basic (M = 4.44, SD = 1.71) or cognitively advanced (M = 3.95, SD = 1.83) did 
not differ statistically significantly, p = .07, d = .28. Similarly, in post-hoc tests moral 
permissibility ratings for individuals with suffering capacity that either were cognitively basic 
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(M = 4.33, SD = 1.74) or cognitively advanced (M = 3.90, SD = 1.81) did not differ 
statistically significantly, p = .14, d = .24.  
 
 
     
Figure 10. Moral permissibility of harming 10 individuals of a hypothetical species to saving 
100 individuals of the same species, ranging from 1 (Absolutely morally wrong), to 4 
(Neither right nor wrong), to 7 (Absolutely morally right). (Study 9) 
 
Discussion 
The results of this study revealed that people hold stronger deontological constraints 
against harming cognitively advanced beings compared to cognitively basic beings. This 
suggests that the reason why people hold stronger deontological constraints against harming 
animals than humans may be partly explained by the fact that people perceive animals to 
have a lower cognitive capacity than humans. However, as we have seen in Study 8, 
cognitive capacity cannot be the full explanation because people continue to have stronger 
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deontological constraints for humans even in cases where they have lower cognitive capacity 
than animals. 
By contrast, the deontological constraints people hold for beings with higher suffering 
capacity were identical to the deontological constraints people hold for beings with lower 
suffering capacity. This is in line with Sytsma and Machery (2012) who also found no 
difference between people’s judgments of harming sentient vs. non-sentient individuals to 
benefit humans, using a similar manipulation to the one used here. This lack of effect is 
surprising considering that in our previous studies we found that perceived suffering capacity 
predicted harm aversion and correlated with moral permissibility. It is also inconsistent with 
the finding that people are less likely to harm robots to save many humans if the robots are 
described as having high degree of affective experience than low degree (Nijssen, et al., 
2019). One possibility is that our suffering capacity manipulation was suboptimal because it 
only focused on the ability to experience hedonic states and emotions, but not on an 
individual’s level of consciousness. In Study 10 we address this by relying on an improved 
manipulation for suffering capacity.  
Another limitation of this study is that participants may have found it hard to imagine 
extraterrestrial beings. The psychological distance for extraterrestrials may be higher than for 
terrestrial animals, which people know and may have even interacted with. It is therefore 
possible that people’s thinking about animals and extraterrestrials fundamentally differs, 
which could make real world inferences from this study difficult.  
 
Study 10: Suffering capacity 
In Study 8, we found that people held stronger deontological constraints for humans 
than animals even when they perceived the humans to have a lower cognitive capacity than 
the animals. This showed that differences in perceived cognitive capacity cannot be the full 
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explanation of the effect. In Study 10, we turned to the related question of whether 
differences in perceived suffering capacity could explain the effect. In the previous studies 
we found that participants perceived animals to have a lower capacity to suffer than humans. 
It could, therefore, be that the weaker deontological constraints against harming animals 
could be completely explained by the fact that people perceive animals to have lower 
capacity to suffer. The capacity to suffer is widely regarded as a key driver of the aversion 
people have to harming others (Gray et al., 2012). (Note that even a utilitarian anti-speciesist 
would prioritize humans over animals if they believe animals suffer less than humans, cf. 
Singer, 1975). To test that hypothesis, we experimentally manipulated suffering capacity. 
More specifically, we presented participants either with a scenario that involved humans in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) who cannot experience any suffering but are still alive, or 
one that involved young dogs that were described as having extremely high capacity to 
suffer. As such, there were two conditions: puppies and patients. 
Although the studies reported so far confirm the hypothesis that harm aversion plays a 
key role in explaining why people find it more permissible to harm animals compared to 
humans, it is plausible that differences in degree of harm aversion cannot fully explain the 
superior moral status that people ascribe to humans. A number of philosophers have argued 
that ‘human’ is used as a moral term and that to classify someone as human is already to 
regard them as meriting special treatment, regardless of what other capacities they may or 
may not possess (Diamond, 1978; Williams, 2009; for a critical approach to this tendency, 
see Singer, 1975). Indeed, many would be horrified by the idea that we could use living 
anencephalic human infants in scientific experiments or for organ donation, although such 
humans lack the capacity to feel pain or any other experience (McMahan, 2002). Our 
hypothesis was therefore that participants would continue to find it more permissible to harm 
a few puppies to save many puppies than to harm a few human patients to save many human 
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patients, despite being more averse to harm the puppies and believing that the patients have 




We recruited 203 US American participants online via MTurk who received $0.40 
payment for their participation. Two participants were excluded for failing an attention 
check, leaving a final sample of 201 people (93 females; Mage = 40.93, SD = 12.86). We 
aimed for a sample size of 210 participants, as our a priori power analysis showed that 200 
participants were required to detect a medium effect size of d = .4, with an alpha of 0.05, and 
power of 0.80.  
Design, materials and procedure 
Participants were again presented with a modified version of the vaccine dilemma 
from Study 1. In the puppies condition, participants were told that there are two dog shelters 
that host many young puppies. The puppies were described as follows: “These puppies have 
an extremely high capacity to experience happiness and pain. Usually they are very happy 
and jump around all day long. But if they get harmed, they experience extremely strong 
pain.” In the patients conditions, participants were told that there are two clinics that host 
PVS (persistent vegetative state) patients. The patients were described as follows: “These 
patients have severe brain damage and have therefore permanently lost the capacity to 
experience any happiness or pain. They will never feel anything, but they are still alive. This 
means that if they get harmed, they will experience absolutely no pain.” Next, as in prior 
vaccine dilemmas, participants were asked whether they consider it morally right or wrong to 
actively kill 10 unaffected puppies/PVS patients to save 100 other puppies/PVS patients. 
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On the next pages, participants were asked questions about the perceived suffering 
capacity (α = .98) and harm aversion (α = .95). The questions were identical to the ones asked 
in Study 4 with the only difference that in the three suffering capacity items point 1 of the 
response scale was “Not suffering at all”, “No pain at all”, and “Not feel hurt at all” to 
account for the fact that in this particular study the patients were described as having no 
suffering capacity at all. Finally, participants responded to the Speciesism Scale (α = .89), 
Empathic Concern Scale (α = .94), and demographic questions. 
 
Results 
Participants considered it more permissible to harm ten puppies in order to save 100 
puppies (M = 3.80; SD = 1.96) than to harm 10 PVS patients to save 100 PVS patients (M = 
3.10, SD = 1.78; Figure 11), t(198) = 2.66, p =.008, d = .38. Harm aversion for dogs (M = 
7.73; SD = 1.48) was stronger than for patients (M = 6.91, SD = 2.07), t(177) = 3.23, p = 
.001, d = .46. Perceived suffering capacity for puppies (M = 7.90, SD = 1.05) was 
considerably higher than for patients (M = 3.32; SD = 2.69), t(127) = 15.82, p < .001, d = 
2.25, which served as a manipulation check. 
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Figure 11. Moral permissibility of harming ten puppies to save a hundred puppies or of 
harming ten persistent vegetative state patients (described as having no suffering capacity) to 
save a hundred PVS patients, ranging from 1 (Absolutely morally wrong), over 4 (Neither 
right nor wrong), to 7 (Absolutely morally right). (Study 10) 
 
Next, we tested the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model. The relationship 
between condition (patients vs. puppies) and moral permissibility was mediated by harm 
aversion. The bootstrapped indirect effect was (-.82)(-.29) = .23, 95% CI [.06, .45]. Thus, the 
indirect effect was statistically significant. However, note that in comparison to the other 
studies, the indirect effect was positive because participants were more averse to harm the 
puppies than the patients. We conducted a hierarchical regression to test which factors were 
driving harm aversion (Table 17). We found that speciesism did not moderate the effect of 
condition onto harm aversion. The bivariate correlation between speciesism and harm 
aversion was -.24 (p = .02) in the patients condition and -.34 (p < .001) in the puppies 
condition (Table 18). However, perceived suffering capacity significantly predicted harm 
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aversion. Thus, in line with our specific prediction for this study, the Harm Aversion 
Mediated Speciesism model was only partly supported. 
Finally, we found that the bivariate correlation between speciesism and suffering 
capacity was stronger in the puppies condition (r = -.36, p < .001) than in the patients 
condition (r = -.15, p = .13). Despite this, speciesism did not significantly moderate the effect 
of condition onto suffering capacity (β < .001, p = 1.0), which is because differences in 
suffering capacity were mostly explained by condition itself (β = -.74, p < .001).  
 
Table 17 
Hierarchical regression predicting harm aversion (Study 10) 
Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 
R2 .11 .17 
Condition  -.23 .06 
Speciesism -.28** -.23* 
Speciesism * Condition .04 .04 
Suffering  .40*** 
Note. Displaying standardized coefficients β. Condition was coded as 1 for PVS patients and 
as 0 for puppies. 
†p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
 
Table 18 
Correlations between measures (Study 10) 
 Permissibi
lity 
Speciesism Harm av. Suffering EC 
Speciesism .27***     
Harm av. -.22*** -.28***    
Suffering .08 -.18** .37***   
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EC -.17** -.29*** .44*** .08  
Condition -.19** .07 -.22*** -.75*** < .01 
Note. Condition was coded as 1 for PVS patients and as 0 for puppies. 
†p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
The results of this study demonstrate that perceived suffering capacity alone cannot 
explain why people have weaker deontological constraints against harming animals than 
humans. Even in the extreme case we relied on in this study, in which the humans were 
described as having no suffering capacity at all and the animals were described as having 
extremely strong suffering capacity (and in addition having used an animal that people 
typically find particularly cute and likeable), participants consider it more permissible to 
harm animals than humans for the greater good. This suggests, in line with our hypothesis for 
this study, that there must be factors above and beyond perceptions of suffering capacity that 
contribute to the differences in strength of deontological constraints for animals and humans. 
It is thus not surprising that the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model was only 
partly supported. In line with the model, suffering capacity predicted harm aversion such that 
participants were more averse to harming puppies than the humans (PVS patients) because 
they perceived the puppies to have greater suffering capacity. However, participants still 
considered it more permissible to harm a few puppies to save many than to harm a few PVS 
patients to save many despite having a greater general aversion to harm the puppies than the 
humans. This is in conflict with a model that assumes that moral permissibility is entirely 
driven by harm aversion.  
Moreover, we found no statistically significant moderation of speciesism onto the 
relationship between condition and harm aversion. One possible explanation could be that—
similar to Study 7—speciesism reduces the aversion to harm dogs (and in particular cute 
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puppies) less than the aversion to harm other animals. However, note that despite the non-
significant moderation, the correlation between speciesism and aversion to harm puppies was 
stronger (r = -.34) than between speciesism and aversion to harm humans (r = -.24). 
Therefore, it is also possible that a moderation effect could be detected with a higher sample 
size. Either way, this study suggests that the speciesism moderation effect alone is unlikely to 
be the only driver of the effect. 
Overall, these results suggest that further psychological factors can drive judgments 
about the permissibility of harm to humans and animals. In particular, the findings suggest 
that harm aversion is not the only mediator between species-membership and moral 
permissibility. One possibility is that speciesism could affect moral permissibility above and 
beyond the harm aversion path. For example, as mentioned in the introduction of this study, 
people may perceive humans, but not animals, to be deserving of special moral treatment 
irrespective of their capacity to suffer.  
 
General Discussion 
Across ten studies we found that people consider it more permissible to harm a few 
animals to save many animals than to harm a few humans to save many humans. The effect 
robustly showed in different types of dilemmas: in personal (Footbridge case) and impersonal 
(Sidetrack case) sacrificial dilemmas (Study 2), in both abstract (Study 4) and concrete (e.g., 
vaccination, Studies 1-3, 5-10) dilemmas, and even in the real-world context of opposition to 
medical experimentation (Study 6). While deontological constraints against harming humans 
were much stronger than those against harming animals, they differed slightly in strength for 
different animals. For example, deontological constraints against harming dogs were stronger 
than those against harming pigs (Study 1). Some people even showed deontological 
constraints for objects, albeit very weak ones (Study 5). 
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These findings closely fit the view we called Multi-level Weighted Deontology, on 
which there are deontological constraints against harming animals but these are considerably 
weaker than those enjoyed by humans. By contrast, our findings are hard to reconcile with 
the competing views we outlined in the introduction. Utilitarianism and Cross Species 
Deontology can be ruled out because people generally value humans more than animals. 
Kant’s view can be ruled out because people do value animals at least to some extent 
(although this could also be due to instrumental reasons). Multi-level Uniform Deontology 
cannot accommodate the consistent finding that deontological constraints against harming 
animals are weaker than those against harming humans even if many of the same respective 
beings can be saved. Nozick’s “utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people” is often 
thought to reflect commonsense intuitions (Kagan, 2019; Killoren & Streiffer, 2019). 
However, while being a good first approximation, Nozick’s slogan does not account for the 
fact that people do have deontological constraints for animals and therefore are not 
completely “utilitarian” for animals. Furthermore, it does not account for the fact that 
deontological constraints can differ for different types of animals. Multi-level Weighted 
Deontology, in contrast, appropriately captures the finding that deontological constraints get 
weaker—without completely disappearing—the less people value the beings at stake. 
Although there was individual variation in the degree to which participants were willing to 
sacrifice some animals to save a greater number—with some participants demonstrating no 
inhibition about harming animals in such moral contexts—our data suggest that the majority 
of participants’ responses is better described by Multi-level Weighted Deontology than by 
any of the other discussed moral views. 
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Underlying factors of the reduced deontological aversion to harm animals 
We are not claiming that people explicitly endorse and follow the principles of Multi-
level Weighted Deontology; it is unlikely that people explicitly grant deontological 
constraints to individuals and consciously weigh these constraints by the moral status they 
attribute to these individuals. Rather, our claim is that Multi-level Weighted Deontology is an 
accurate philosophical description of the pattern of moral judgments people make. This, 
however, leaves open the question of what psychological mechanisms underlie these 
judgment patterns. 
In the introduction we hypothesized that people would consider it more permissible to 
harm animals than humans for the greater good because of a reduced general aversion to 
harm animals than humans (mediation from condition via harm aversion to moral 
permissibility). Further, we hypothesized that harm aversion is driven by perceived suffering 
capacity and perceived cognitive capacity and that harm aversion for animals is affected more 
by speciesism than harm aversion for humans (moderation). Across our studies we tested this 
Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model and found support for it. However, that was not 
the case in all the studies, suggesting that further factors might be involved. 
Harm aversion. Across our studies we found evidence that the weaker deontological 
constraints against harming animals than against harming humans are likely driven by a 
weaker aversion to harm animals in general. In Study 3, we systematically teased apart the 
deontological inclination to avoid harm from the utilitarian inclination to help as many as 
possible and found that the deontological inclination to avoid harm was much weaker for 
animals than for humans. In contrast, the utilitarian inclination did not statistically differ for 
animals and humans. In the majority of the studies in which we included the self-report harm 
aversion scales, we found that harm aversion significantly mediated the effect from condition 
(humans vs. animals) to moral permissibility.  
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In Study 10, we found that participants had stronger deontological constraints for 
patients in the persistent vegetative state than for puppies despite being more averse to 
harming the puppies. This suggests that harm aversion might not be the only driver of moral 
permissibility and that future research could expand our model to include further drivers of 
moral permissibility. One possibility is that people ascribe a special moral status to humans 
simply in virtue of them being human, regardless of their capacity for suffering or cognitive 
capacity. The philosopher Bernard Williams, for example, wrote that “creatures are treated in 
one way rather than another simply because they belong to a certain category, the human 
species. We do not… need to know any more about them.” (Williams, 2006). 
Setting this exception aside, our studies demonstrate that harm aversion is a strong 
predictor of the perceived moral permissibility of harming few to save a greater number. But 
what are the drivers of harm aversion? Since humans and animals differ in many ways, we 
investigated several possible factors that could explain why people are less averse to harming 
animals than humans. 
Social Connectedness. In Study 7, we ruled out the possibility that the effect can be 
explained by the fact that people feel less socially connected to animals. We found that 
participants’ deontological constraints against harming animals were still weaker than those 
against harming humans, even if participants felt more socially connected to the animals 
(e.g., their own dogs) than to the humans (e.g., complete strangers).  
Suffering capacity. In all six studies in which we included the perceived suffering 
capacity scales, we found that perceived suffering capacity was a significant predictor of 
harm aversion. And since participants tended to believe that animals are less capable of 
suffering than humans (apart as expected from Study 10), this suggests that perceived 
suffering capacity could indeed partly explain why animals are granted weaker deontological 
constraints than humans. However, despite the important role of perceived suffering capacity, 
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our findings show that it cannot explain the effect fully. In Study 10, participants continued to 
have stronger deontological constraints for humans than animals even in cases where the 
humans have no suffering capacity at all (PVS patients) and the animals have an extremely 
strong suffering capacity.  
Cognitive capacity. In Study 9, we found that participants held stronger 
deontological constraints against harming hypothetical beings with an advanced cognitive 
capacity than against harming hypothetical beings with a basic cognitive capacity. Since 
humans generally have a more advanced cognitive capacity than animals, this suggests that 
perceived cognitive capacity could partly explain the effect. This result is in line with the 
Kantian idea that a higher cognitive capacity—and in particular those aspects relating to 
rationality and autonomous agency—is ground for elevated moral status (even though people 
clearly reject the view, also associated with Kant, that animals have the same moral status as 
mere objects). However, although perceived cognitive capacity plays a role in driving 
judgments about the permissibility of harm, we found that it too cannot explain the effect 
fully. In Study 8, participants accepted stronger deontological constraints against harming 
humans who are severely cognitively impaired than against harming chimpanzees, even 
though participants believed that the chimpanzees had a more advanced cognitive capacity 
than the humans (including greater intelligence, rationality, ability to plan for the future, self-
awareness, etc.). 
Speciesism. Our studies also offer evidence that in addition to the contributions made 
by perceived suffering capacity and cognitive capacity, reduced aversion to harming animals 
than humans is also partly driven by differential moral value attribution based on species-
membership itself, i.e., speciesism. According to this hypothesis, people are less averse to 
harm animals than humans simply because animals are animals and humans are humans. 
There are three convergent types of evidence supporting this hypothesis.  
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First, in four of the six studies in which we measured harm aversion, we found that 
speciesism as measured by the Speciesism Scale (Caviola et al., 2019) significantly 
moderated the effect of condition (humans vs. animals) onto harm aversion. In the two 
studies (Study 7 and 10) in which the moderation was not significant the animal species were 
dogs. It is therefore possible that the lack of significant moderation effects in these studies 
was specific to the use of dogs, since speciesism appears to be a weaker predictor for 
aversion to harming dogs than aversion to harming other animals. Nevertheless, the lack of 
significant moderation in these two studies highlights that speciesism is not the only predictor 
of the reduced aversion to harm animals.  
Second, in the process dissociation study (Study 3) individual differences in 
speciesism correlated strongly (r = -.65) with the deontological inclination against harming 
animals. Speciesism did not correlate with the deontological inclination against harming 
humans, and neither did it correlate with the utilitarian inclination to help as many humans or 
animals as possible. The process dissociation approach allowed us to disentangle the 
deontological and utilitarian inclinations from each other, which usually both contribute to 
the overall moral judgment in sacrificial moral dilemmas (cf. Conway, & Gawronski, 2013).  
Third, throughout our studies we found that deontological constraints against harming 
animals remained weaker than those against harming humans even when other plausible 
drivers, such as perceived suffering capacity, ascribed cognitive capacity, and social 
connectedness were accounted for. Humans and animals differ on multiple dimensions and it 
is possible that there are other factors that we did not consider. However, the fact that a 
robust effect remains even after controlling for key factors suggested both by psychological 
research and ethical debate about moral status provides probabilistic—if not conclusive—
evidence for the speciesism hypothesis. 
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Furthermore, we found evidence that speciesism is associated with perceptions of 
reduced suffering capacity and reduced cognitive capacity of animals. This is in line with 
previous research showing that people tend to de-mentalize animals (Bastian et al., 2012). It 
suggests that speciesism may not only reduce aversion to harm animals directly but also 
indirectly via attributing lower mental capacities to them, which in turn could reduce harm 
aversion. 
Our studies thus offer a degree of empirical support to the influential (if controversial) 
philosophical argument claiming that the common view that humans are morally more 
important than animals is based in speciesism (McMahan, 2002; Singer, 1993). However, 
future research is called to explore in more detail why people have a greater willingness to 
harm animals than humans, even in cases where the humans suffer less and are less 
cognitively capable than the animals.  
In sum, our studies mostly confirm the Harm Aversion Mediated Speciesism Model 
but also show that the model needs to be extended: People consider it more permissible to 
harm animals for the greater good than to humans for the greater because they have generally 
a weaker aversion to harm animals than humans. The weaker aversion to harm animals is 
driven in part by people believing that animals suffer less, and that they have a lower 
cognitive capacity, as well as by speciesism. It is possible that additional drivers of moral 
permissibility exist that we did not explore in our studies. 
Thus, the two models we have discussed in this paper—Harm Aversion Mediated 
Speciesism and Multi-Level Weighted Deontology—both describe the moral judgments 
people make in our studies. While Multi-Level Weighted Deontology is a philosophical 
description of these judgments and is contrasted with alternative philosophical views, Harm 
Aversion Mediated Speciesism describes the psychological mechanisms of these judgments 
in more detail. They are two sides of the same coin. 
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Moral judgments in cross-species sacrifice cases 
So far, we have only focused on the type of individuals that have to be harmed but not 
those that can be helped. However, in the cross-species sacrifice cases of Study 4, we found 
that people also take into account what type of individuals can be saved. We found that 
people considered it only slightly more permissible to harm pigs to save many humans than 
to save many pigs. In contrast, people were much more sensitive to the type of individuals 
that could be saved if humans had to be harmed. They were strongly opposed to harming 
humans in order to save many pigs, whereas harming humans to save many humans was 
considered to be less wrong on average. How can this asymmetry be explained? 
One way to explain this is as follows: The lower the moral status of the individual that 
needs to be harmed, the weaker the deontological constraint against harming that individual. 
The stronger the deontological constraints, the more difficult it is to overrule them. People 
have a rough threshold—that varies between individuals and contexts—for when to overrule 
a given deontological constraint. Whether this threshold is met depends on the utilitarian 
cost-benefit analysis, which people will engage in if they are capable of doing so. In cases 
where animals have to be harmed to save either many animals or many humans, the threshold 
is clearly met in both cases—though since people value humans much more than animals, it 
is more easily met if humans instead of animals can be saved. In contrast, however, in cases 
where humans have to be harmed to save either many humans or many animals, the threshold 
is not clearly met, and the difference in how easily it is met is far greater than in the previous 
cases. The threshold for harming humans to save many humans may be met to some extent in 
some people. But since people value humans much more than animals, the threshold for 
harming humans to save animals will be met, if at all, only if a vast number of animals will 
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be saved. As a consequence, the extent to which deontological constraints against harming 
are overruled differs across these four cases and results in the observed asymmetry. 
This explanation assumes that people assign a certain value to the life of a single 
animal and another value to the life of a single human—all using the same moral value 
“currency”. These values are then aggregated each based on the number of individuals on 
each side and contrasted against each other. The contrasted aggregated values are then 
matched against a common threshold value that is measured in this shared currency. An 
advantage of this explanation is that it could also deal with mixed sacrifice cases, such as a 
case where 55 pigs have to be harmed to save 50 pigs plus 2 humans, which is a type of case 
we did not test but future research could look into. 
A reason to be skeptical of the described view could be that it appears psychologically 
implausible that people engage in such complex calculations and rely on a common moral 
value currency. Instead, it may be more plausible that a much rougher estimate, that is itself 
partly affect-based, is at work. One possibility is that the threshold for when deontological 
constraints should be overruled is different depending on what type of individuals can be 
saved. The threshold is lower, the lower the perceived moral status of the individuals that can 
be saved. This view, however, is harder to reconcile with the idea of a fixed aversive 
response against harming dictating the strength of the deontological constraint since it 
suggests that the constraint against harming does not arise from an affective response to 
considerations of the harmful act in isolation, but is instead modulated by which individuals 
would be saved by that act, and how many. In other words, on this view the degree of 
aversion to harm and the calculation of consequences interact rather than being generated 
independently, as is often assumed by current models of moral judgement. 
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Implications for the psychology of moral judgment 
Current psychological research on deontological rules against harming others often 
models such rules on Kant’s ethics, and therefore understands them as representing absolute 
prohibitions against certain actions. It is implausible, however, that lay people regard 
deontological rules as absolute in this way (Kahane, 2015). Lay people’s intuitions accept a 
plurality of moral rules which can conflict in some cases. When this happens one rule will 
typically overrule another (e.g., we may break a minor promise if keeping it would be deeply 
unfair). Similarly, deontological constraints can be overruled when the consequences of 
following them are too severe—e.g., lying when this will prevent murder and, more 
controversially, the use of ‘enhanced interrogation methods’ to prevent terrorist attacks. The 
present research provides a demonstration of this central feature of commonsense morality. 
While the absolutist understanding of deontological rules suggest the all-or-nothing picture 
suggested by Nozick’s proposal—absolute prohibitions protecting humans, cost-benefit 
analysis for animals—our findings strongly support a Multi-level Weighted Deontology 
account of judgments about harm towards humans and animals. We repeatedly found that 
deontological constraints are a matter of degree. And when and whether they will be 
overruled is a function both of the individuals to be harmed, the individuals to be saved, and 
the numbers of each.  
Our findings consequently also show that moral thinking about harm to humans and 
animals is not fundamentally different but rather varies in degree. People value animals much 
less than humans and accordingly grant them much weaker deontological constraints. 
Importantly, though it is not the case that people have no deontological constraints for 
animals whatsoever. This difference in degree, however, can be very substantial, and most 
people consider it fairly wrong to harm humans while fairly permissible to harm animals for 
the greater good. 
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Animals are seen neither as objects nor as persons 
Our findings support Nozick’s suggestion (1974) that people place animals into a 
moral category between humans and objects. In some respects, animals are perceived as 
having a moral status similar to that of inanimate objects: like objects, people consider it 
morally permissible to own animals, to treat them as a tool for another’s purpose, to deny 
them of their autonomy, or to treat them as interchangeable with other animals—properties 
that the philosopher Martha Nussbaum (1995) has identified as aspects of objectification. 
However, in contrast to objects, animals are seen as sentient beings that deserve some moral 
protection. For example, we found that people consider it permissible to destroy an object but 
not to harm an animal, if the sole purpose is to fulfil a personal preference. (The case of meat 
consumption appears to be an exception and might be related to people’s tendency to de-
mentalize farmed animals; see Bastian et al., 2012) 
The fact that deontological constraints for humans are much higher than those for 
animals is reflected by the fact that humans are seen as possessing inalienable rights, but such 
rights are rarely, if ever, ascribed to animals. Most people of Western societies are firm 
believers in basic human rights such as a right to life, bodily integrity and autonomy—rights 
that are inalienable and absolute. Even humans without advanced cognitive capacity such as 
human infants or cognitively severely disabled humans are granted these same basic rights. 
Animals, in contrast, are not granted equivalent rights, not even the most basic ones. This 
shows, for example, in the context of medical experimentation or exploitation for 
consumption.  
The strength of deontological protections people grant animals may predict how well 
they treat animals more generally. Historically, moral attitudes towards animals have been 
changing (Kelch, 2012; Pinker, 2012). In medieval Europe, for example, burning cats was 
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considered a form of entertainment (Benton, 1997). Today, most people are opposed to 
unnecessary cruelty to animals (Vaughn et al., 2009). And since the 1970s, the animal rights 
movement has emerged, advocating not just for better treatment of animals but also for 
granting legal rights to animals (Singer, 1973). In our studies, we found that people had much 
weaker constraints against harming animals than against harming humans. But they still (on 
average) granted animals at least some weak deontological protections. It is possible that a 
few centuries ago people would have granted animals even weaker deontological protections 
than today, and that in the future they will grant them even stronger ones. That being said, the 
deontological protections that people currently grant animals are not yet strong enough to 
make people view it wrong to harm animals in order to benefit humans. 
 
Limitations and future research 
We have identified Multi-level Weighted Deontology as the model that best describes 
people’s intuitions about when it is permissible to harm humans and animals. Future research 
could explore the model further and make it more precise. Future research could look at a 
wider range of cross-species sacrifice cases as well as at mixed cases in which a group of 
individuals consisting of different species would have to be harmed or saved.  
We concluded that there are likely multiple factors that explain why aversion to harm 
animals is weaker than the aversion to harm humans, amongst them perceived suffering 
capacity, perceived cognitive capacity, and speciesism. However, our studies cannot rule out 
other underlying factors that we have not explicitly explored in our studies—such as the 
appearance and behavior of the respective individuals or the fact that people may be more 
familiar with thinking about moral rights for humans than animals. Future research could also 
attempt to estimate the relative degree to which each factor contributes to the effect. 
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In Study 10 we found evidence that species-membership can affect permissibility of 
harming a few to save many without being mediated by harm aversion. Future research could 
attempt to replicate this finding and explore this potential additional path in more depth. For 
example, it could be tested whether people grant humans special moral status simply in virtue 
of them being human, regardless of their capacities. 
While we currently consider it plausible that speciesism is indeed a driving factor—
echoing an influential philosophical view (Singer, 1975)—it is possible that the effect can 
instead be explained by other factors that are typically associated with species-membership. 
Future research could investigate which factors make people conceptualize a being as an 
animal or as a human. For example, would people conceptualize a cognitively highly 
advanced chimpanzee still as an animal or, instead, as a person and thus, perhaps no longer as 
an animal? What if an animal closely resembled humans in appearance and aspects of 
behavior while lacking normal human cognitive capacity? An empirical investigation of these 
questions could give us a deeper understanding of the psychological mechanisms at play.  
 
Conclusion 
Bentham argued that what matters is whether a being suffers, not how smart it is, and 
utilitarians hold that we should maximize utility—by saving the greater number—regardless 
of species-membership. Kant held that there are some things we must never do to other 
rational beings, even if they would maximize utility, and that people therefore enjoy 
deontological protections from certain kinds of trade-offs. Nozick proposed a way in which 
these two views might be combined: that Kant is right about humans, but Bentham is right 
about animals: “Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People”. We found that neither of 
these views succeeds in capturing how most people think about harm to humans vs. to 
animals. People are deontological all the way down—but they do not regard deontological 
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protections as absolute but as getting increasingly weaker as we go down the ‘chain of 
being’. 
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